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Abstract 
Why do some students learn more in some schools than others? One consideration receiving growing 
attention is school management. To study this, researchers need to be able to measure school 
management accurately and cheaply at scale, and also explain any observed relationship between 
school management and student learning. This paper introduces a new approach to measurement 
using existing public data, and applies it to build a management index covering 15,000 schools across 
65 countries, and another index covering nearly all public schools in Brazil. Both indices show a 
strong, positive relationship between school management and student learning. The paper then 
develops a simple model that formalizes the intuition that strong management practices might be 
driving learning gains via incentive and selection effects among teachers, students and parents. The 
paper shows that the predictions of this model hold in public data for Latin America, and draws out 
implications for policy. 
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1 Introduction
Despite global calls for improvements in education, progress towards learning for all is slow. This
deficit is particularly pronounced for poor children and children in low-income countries [Akmal and
Pritchett, 2019]. But why do some students learn more in some schools than others? While there
are many contributing factors at system, school, and household-level, one consideration receiving
growing attention is school management—the processes and practices used by principals day-to-
day as they run their schools [World Bank, 2018]. Academics and practitioners interested in this
issue face two challenges: how to measure school management accurately and cost-effectively at
scale across schools and countries; and how to explain any observed relationship between school
management and learning outcomes in a way that elucidates the underlying mechanisms to guide
policy. This paper addresses both of these challenges.
Our first contribution is to develop a new approach to measurement that can, in principle, be used
with any existing public dataset containing items about school management. We illustrate using
two public datasets as examples: the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment
(PISA), and the Brazilian school census survey, Prova Brasil. The essence of our approach is to
benchmark against the “state of the art”, but expensive, World Management Survey (WMS) in
Bloom et al. [2015a]. We show how questions from these public surveys can be classified into WMS
topics (53 PISA questions into 14 WMS topics and 33 Prova Brasil questions into 8 WMS topics),
how the responses can be coded using the WMS scoring rubric, and finally how these grades can be
built into a school management index. Our PISA-based index covers over 15,000 schools across 65
countries, and our Prova Brasil-based index covers nearly all public schools in Brazil. These indices
are well-validated and can be used by researchers interested in studying the role of management in
education systems across a far wider range of countries and schools than was previously possible.1
All three indices, WMS, PISA, and Prova Brasil, show a strong, positive (within-country) correlation
between school management and student learning outcomes, echoing recent causal evidence from
randomized controlled trials in the U.S. [Fryer, 2014, 2017].
Our second contribution is to develop a framework to explore why management matters for schools.
We set out, in general terms, how the impact of school management can be decomposed into learning
gains that arise because given actors (teachers, students and parents) become more productive, and
learning gains that arise because different actors join the school. To explore why these incentive
and selection effects might arise, we turn to a specific model that captures key features of education
systems in Latin America.
This model has two main building blocks. The first is the education production function: we assume
that student learning depends on teacher ability, teacher effort, and household effort. The second is
the impact of management practices where, considering the personnel policy restrictions the public
sector faces, we distinguish between operations and people management. Good people management
1For example, see Wössmann [2016] for a review of education systems research using large, cross-country surveys.
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practices enable managers to observe and contract on the performance of their employees, as well
as to cultivate the intrinsic motivation of their staff. Good operations management practices enable
managers to use resources efficiently and hence offer a higher level of teacher compensation and a
more stimulating environment for students.2
Our framework predicts that good people management practices increase expected test scores
through two channels. A teacher with a given ability and intrinsic motivation to teach exerts more
effort because these practices provide extrinsic, and cultivate intrinsic, incentives. Compounding
this, good people management practices improve selection: a teacher with high ability and high
intrinsic motivation prefers a school with performance pay over alternative employments because
she anticipates that she will work hard and be rewarded for producing student learning. We focus
on Latin American countries and find support for both mechanisms in our PISA data. Principals
in schools with higher PISA-based people management scores (predominantly private schools) are
less likely to report experiencing teacher shortages and also report higher levels of teacher moti-
vation and effort, compared to principals in schools with lower PISA-based people management
scores.
Our framework also predicts that good operations management practices increase expected test
scores through two channels. There is no teacher incentive effect but the selection effect remains,
now driven by the level rather than structure of compensation. This is reinforced by a household
incentive effect that arises because strong operations management practices encourage both students
and parents to increase their inputs. We also find evidence of these mechanisms in our PISA data
for Latin America. Principals in public schools with higher PISA-based operations management
scores are less likely to report experiencing teacher shortages and also report higher levels of teacher
motivation, teacher effort and household effort, compared to principals in public schools with lower
PISA-based operations management scores.
While this is not definitive causal evidence, this combination of theory and descriptive empirical
analysis offers a novel insight into why management matters in schools and we therefore move on to
consider policy implications. People management practices such as performance pay, while common
in the private sector, may not be possible in public schools. But there would seem to be fewer
barriers to conducting assessments to judge teacher effectiveness, and letting such appraisals lead
to changes in public recognition, opportunities for professional development, likelihood of career
advancement, and/or greater responsibilities. That is, these people management practices help
to attract, develop and reward good performers, and, our analysis suggests, should improve both
teacher selection and incentives.
There is also substantial variation in the strength of operations management practices within the
public sector. This suggest a role for government to encourage principals in public schools with weak
operations management to follow best practices. Specific areas suggested by our analysis include
2This assumption echoes the observation made by Baker et al. [1988] that compensation plans featuring explicit
financial rewards seldom account for all of a worker’s rewards.
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processes that facilitate: personalization of learning; dialogue among staff, students and parents
focused on continuous improvement; and collection and use of student assessment data.
Related literature. Our first contribution—a new approach to measure management practices in
schools—relates to two bodies of work. The first is the literature that has evolved since the creation
of the WMS dataset first described in Bloom and Van Reenen [2007]. The WMS methodology
has been adapted to a range of public sector institutions, including schools and universities [Bloom
et al., 2015a, McCormack et al., 2014], healthcare facilities [Bloom et al., 2015b, 2019b], social
programs [Delfgaauw et al., 2011, McConnell et al., 2009], and the civil service [Rasul and Rogger,
2016], as well as to low-income settings [Lemos and Scur, 2016]. However, it is expensive and time-
consuming to implement at scale; our approach is a feasible alternative. The second is the literature
studying the role of education systems and institutions in determining student performance across
countries [Wössmann, 2016]. Many recent papers use PISA data and have looked at this issue
through the lens of autonomy [Hanushek et al., 2013, Wössmann et al., 2007], competition [West
and Wössmann, 2010], student tracking [Hanushek and Wössmann, 2006, Ruhose and Schwerdt,
2016], external exams [Wössmann, 2005], and instructional time [Lavy, 2015]. Our PISA-based
index enables researchers to consider school management in such studies.
Our second contribution—a framework to explain why management matters in schools—relates to
the literature in personnel economics exploring incentives and selection. These channels have fea-
tured in prior work seeking to explain the performance of private sector employees [Bender et al.,
2018, Cornwell et al., 2019, Lazear, 2000], public sector employees [Finan et al., 2017, Prendergast,
2007] and politicians [Besley, 2004, 2006, Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013, Martinez-Bravo, 2014].
Most closely related is Lazear [2003], who emphasises the potential selection margin of teacher
performance pay, albeit without fully working up a formal model.3 A selection margin also fea-
tures in the dynamic occupational model of Rothstein [2015] and the Roy model of Biasi [2019].
We study a wider range of management practices (beyond just performance pay) and provide an
intuitive decomposition of the impact of these practices on student learning into incentives and
selection.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set out our approach to measure
management practices in schools, illustrating with the construction and validation of PISA-based
and Prova Brasil-based management indices. In Section 3, we describe our theoretical framework,
its testable predictions, a series of corroborative descriptive analyses from across Latin America,
and the policy implications of these results. Section 4 concludes.
3See also Dohmen and Falk [2010] who briefly sketch out theoretical reasons why fixed wage contracts and piece
rates might be expected to have different impacts on sorting by ability.
3
2 How to measure management in schools?
Until the early 2000s, management was typically viewed as an unmeasurable productivity shifter,
to be relegated to the residual in any performance regression [Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007]. Since
then, improvements in survey methodology and data access have allowed for advances in measure-
ment. The current “state of the art” approach uses a dedicated survey—the World Management
Survey (WMS)—to measure establishments’ adoption of structured management best practices.
While the WMS offers uniquely rich information about management practices, it costs approxi-
mately USD400 per interview and takes about 4 months to conduct a single country wave [Bloom
et al., 2016]. In view of these costs, it may not be well-suited to every context.
In this section, we propose an alternative three-step approach than can, in principle, be used with
any existing public dataset containing information on management practices. The first step is to use
the original WMS phone survey as a benchmark, and to look for questions in the public survey that
elicit information on the management practices already measured by the WMS.4 The second step is
to code answers in line with the WMS methodology. And the final step is to create a management
index. In Section 2.1, we provide a brief overview of the WMS questions and coding. In Section 2.2,
we describe our approach using two existing public datasets as examples: PISA and the Brazilian
school census survey, Prova Brasil. Since Brazil and several other PISA countries are part of the
Bloom et al. [2015a] sample, we can compare the (within-country) distribution of each index with
the corresponding (within-country) distribution of the WMS index. Both indices are well-validated
and can therefore be used by researchers interested in studying management across a wider range
of countries and schools than was previously possible.
2.1 Overview of the World Management Survey methodology
The WMS was developed to measure adoption of structured management best practices in estab-
lishments across a range of countries and industries.5 The rigorous data collection is based on
double-blind, semi-structured interviews conducted by highly-trained analysts and monitored by
supervisors experienced on the survey methodology. Following its successful implementation in the
private sector, the WMS was subsequently extended to public sector organizations [Bloom et al.,
2015a, 2019b]; in this paper, we focus on the latter.
The public-sector WMS covers 20 topics across two main areas: operations management and peo-
ple management. Broadly speaking, operations management in schools covers practices including:
whether the school has standardization of instructional processes across classrooms while allowing
4Our approach follows the spirit of the re-casting of the original phone-based World Management Survey into
the US Census Management and Organizational Practices Survey (MOPS) administered to the population of US
manufacturing establishments as a self-reported questionnaire [Bloom et al., 2019a]. The MOPS has been replicated
in a number of other countries. Its questions follow the WMS topics and look to measure similar practices, but with
self-reported answers.
5See Bloom and Van Reenen [2007] for the survey’s inception and Bloom et al. [2016] for a recent review.
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for within-classroom personalization of learning; whether and how the school uses assessments and
data; and whether and how the school sets and uses targets and keeps track of progress. People
management covers practices in handling good and bad performance measuring whether there is a
systematic approach to identifying good and bad performance, rewarding school teachers propor-
tionately, dealing with underperformers, and promoting and retaining good performers.
For each WMS topic, there is a scoring grid ranging from 1 to 5, which serves as a guide to evaluate
answers to questions during the semi-structured interviews. A score between 1 to 2 refers to a
school with practically no structured management practices or very weak management practices
implemented; a score between 2 to 3 refers to a school with some informal practices implemented,
but these practices consist mostly of a reactive approach to managing the school; a score between
3 to 4 refers to a school where a good, formal management process is in place (though not yet
consistent enough) and these practices consist mostly of a proactive approach to managing a school;
and a score between 4 to 5 refers to well-defined, strong processes in place which are often seen as
best practices in education. The overall management index, which measures the level of adoption of
structured management best practices, is simply the average of the scores for these 20 topics.
The practices measured by the survey seem to matter: Bloom et al. [2015a] show that their school
management score is strongly positively correlated with school-level student outcomes across 6 WMS
countries (Brazil, Canada, India, Sweden, UK and US).6 They find a strong positive correlation for
these countries: moving from the bottom to the top quartile of management is associated with a large
increase in student learning outcomes, equivalent to approximately 0.4 standard deviations.
2.2 A new approach using existing public datasets
We now describe our approach, illustrating with the examples of PISA and Prova Brasil.7.
Construction. In 2012, alongside its famous student proficiency tests, PISA ran school principal
surveys across 65 countries which included a wide-range of questions on both operations and people
management.8 As a first step, we classified each of the PISA questions that could fall under one of
the WMS topics, identifying 53 PISA questions that fit into 14 of the WMS topics.9 As a second
step, we manually assigned scores for each of these PISA questions following the spirit of the scoring
grid of the WMS and the US Census Management and Organizational Practices Survey (MOPS). As
a final step, we built the overall management index, and the operations and people management sub-
indices, following Anderson [2008]. This methodology weights the impact of the included variables
6We replicate the primary figure from Bloom et al. [2015a] in Figure B.3 in Appendix B. It plots the school-level
student learning outcomes by each quartile of school management score.
7We provide details to enable replication in Appendix C
8Our main focus is on the 2012 data because that survey wave contains a richer set of questions, particularly
relating to people management. See Appendix C for a mapping of the 2015 PISA data.
9The set of WMS topics that had matching PISA questions is detailed in Appendix C.
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by the sum of their row in the inverse variance-covariance matrix, thereby assigning greater weight
to questions that carry more “new information”.10
PISA data is excellent for cross-country analysis, but it precludes in-depth analyses within countries
as the sample of schools per country is typically small and does not include the necessary identi-
fiers. Many countries, however, conduct their own national detailed surveys with school principals,
teachers, and students in addition to administering standardized tests across grades. Latin America
is particularly prolific: for example, Brazil’s Prova Brasil, Colombia’s SABER, Chile’s SIMCE, and
Peru’s ECE are all available to researchers. These questionnaires provide rich information about
practices at the school, as reported by a range of actors. In addition, the samples are usually large
(often census-based) and contain school identifiers, thereby enabling researchers to explore hetero-
geneity and answer a wide range of policy-relevant questions. We illustrate how our approach can
be applied widely to other national surveys using the example of Prova Brasil. This national survey
plays a significant role in Brazil’s education policy because its test results, along with promotion,
dropout, and retention rates, are the main inputs to the Índice de Desenvolvimento da Educação
Básica (IDEB), a national index representing educational quality at the school, municipality, and
state levels.
We followed the same steps to create a Prova Brasil-based management index: we classified 33
questions (14 from the principal questionnaire and 19 from the teacher questionnaire) into 8 WMS
topics, coded responses following the same rubric, and used the Anderson [2008] method to build a
school management index.
Potential concerns. One of the key differences between the WMS survey and PISA or school
census surveys is that the WMS is administered and analyzed by an independent interviewer, while
the latter surveys are self-reported. There are a number of issues with self-reported data: for ex-
ample, problems with translation and interpretation, and/or measurement equivalence. To address
measurement error of cross-cultural understandings and norms on answering questions in our PISA
index, we standardize our PISA-based management index within countries. This has an important
implication: since all 65 countries have a mean score of zero, our index cannot be used to construct
cross-country rankings of school management. Instead, the value of our PISA-based index lies in
enabling academics and practitioners to study the (within-country) correlation between manage-
ment and other variables for a far wider set of countries than was previously possible.11 This is not
a concern for country-specific national surveys.
10We also built the indices using alternative methods (straightforward standardization, factor analysis, and factor
analysis with Bartlett correction) which yielded similar results.
11In the 2012 PISA the dataset included a PISA-built ‘leadership and management’ measure. This is distinctively
different from ours, as it was based off a section of the questionnaire that was titled ‘management’ and contained
only a small subset of questions. This index fails to take advantage of the full questionnaire and the information
available elsewhere that also speaks to managerial practices used in the schools. More pertinently, PISA’s measure
does not compare well to the (empirically robust) management index derived from the World Management Survey
(see Liberto et al. [2015]).
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Another concern with self-reported data is that it is difficult to assess whether respondents are being
accurate and truthful. In the WMS there are several strategies to elicit truthful information during
the interview (such as always asking open-ended questions and asking for examples), but these are
not available in self-reported questionnaires. We address this issue by focusing on the topics that
have a direct equivalent in the WMS to allow for a clear benchmark for our new index. If principals
are reporting “good” information in these surveys that allow us to capture similar signals as the
WMS scores, we should see similar distributions of scores across the common countries and a similar
overall relationship between management and student test scores across countries. For PISA, we
compare the distribution of scores and the performance correlations for the common countries as
there are no school identifiers available. For Prova Brasil, we use school identifiers to match schools
directly and hence provide a one-to-one comparison of the index standardized values.
Validation of new indices. As a first validation exercise, we compare the distribution of our
PISA-based management index with the distribution of school management as measured by the
WMS data in Figure 1 for all countries that the WMS has collected data.12 The PISA and WMS
distributions are reassuringly similar. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions
rejects in only one of the 9 cases, Italy, where the PISA-index is somewhat more dispersed.13
As a second validation exercise, and to ensure we are picking up important variation with our
management index, we conduct a basic check of the correlation between our measure and student
performance. For each country we separate schools into quartiles of the management measure, and
in Figure 2 we show, for each quartile, the average PISA test scores for math, reading and science
(in deviations from the global mean). The graph includes all students and schools across the 65
countries available in the 2012 PISA dataset. This simple relationship suggests that students in
schools in the bottom quartile of management within their country score are, on average, about 6
points lower than the PISA global mean, while students in schools in the top quartile of management
within their country score, on average, about 5.5 points higher than the PISA global mean. To put
this into context, 41 PISA points in math are the equivalent of a year of learning. The range of
our results mirror how much, for example, the UK average science score changed between 2009 and
2015 (5 points), and how much the Brazilian average science score decreased over the same period
(4 points).
Unlike PISA, the data in Prova Brasil includes school identifiers that allow for a one-to-one match
with the schools surveyed in the 2013 WMS wave.14 In total, we have 262 matched schools in
the public sector. We use this matched sample in Figure 3 where we show a school-level binned
12Independent researchers conducted the WMS in Colombia and Mexico during 2015, with guidance and super-
vision from the original WMS team. These data were not available to Bloom et al. [2015a]. India is not included in
Figure 1 because it did not participate in PISA in 2012.
13We show comparisons between the WMS and PISA sub-indices for operations management in Figure B.1 and
people management in in Figure B.2 in Appendix B and confirm that the distributions are consistent for both
sub-indices.
14Prova Brasil was also administered in 2013.
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scatter plot of WMS management score against the Prova Brasil-based management score. There is
a positive and significant correlation of 0.19, suggesting reasonable internal validation of the Prova
Brasil index. As with the PISA index, we repeat the exercise of correlating the new index with
student performance in secondary schools and find the same pattern (see Figure 4).
In Table 1 we formalize these relationships by reporting the average correlations between student
learning and our management indices. For the student-level PISA dataset, we run OLS regressions
via the OECD’s repest Stata command, which uses the five available test score plausible values
for each student and subject. We report the standard errors in parentheses and p-values in square
brackets. The standard errors are clustered at the school level and use the appropriate survey
weights.15 In the PISA specifications we include country fixed effects, and successively introduce
school controls (dummies for school location, student-teacher ratio, log of the number of students,
share of government funding relative to total funding the school receives, and ratio of computers
connected to the web used as a proxy for school resources) and then student controls (gender, grade,
socio-economic status and immigration status). All panels use the same sample but have different
subject outcome variables. The R-squared for each set of regressions is reported within each panel,
while the common sample characteristics and controls included are reported at the bottom of the
table. Column (1) shows the raw relationship between the PISA-based school management index
and student performance, only controlling for country fixed effects. The raw relationship ranges
from just over 4 to almost 5 points on the PISA scale.16 Recall that 41 points on the PISA scale
for math is equivalent to about one year of learning, and thus the raw correlation is equivalent to
about one month of learning for math (similar for the other subjects). Column (2) includes school
controls, which absorb little of the variation, and Column (3) shows the fully-specified regression
including student controls. These controls account for a further point in the student performance.
While we refrain from ranking management indices across countries, Figure 5 plots the coefficients
of country-level regressions of management on PISA math test scores using the specification of
Column (1). The estimation loses precision once we restrict to individual country samples but still
broadly supports the positive relationship found in Table 1.
For the Prova Brasil student-level dataset, we run standard OLS regressions, also clustering the
standard errors at the school level. Results are reported in standard deviations. In these Prova Brasil
specifications, we include state fixed effects, and successively introduce school controls (student-
teacher ratio, log of the number of students, dummy variables indicating the presence of an IT
lab, science lab, and library, a dummy for male principals, dummies for educational attainment,
and dummies for experience as principal), and then student controls (gender, race, socio-economic
status, and mothers’ educational attainment). Column (4) shows the raw relationship between the
Prova Brasil-based school management index and student performance, only controlling for state
fixed effects. One standard deviation higher score in the management index is strongly correlated
with 0.068 standard deviations higher Portuguese scores and 0.078 standard deviations higher math
15See Jerrim et al. [2017] for a thorough review of how to best use PISA scores and survey weights.
16PISA is standardized across years and countries such that the mean is 500 and the standard deviation is 100.
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scores. Column (5) shows that including school characteristics absorbs very little of the variation,
while Column (6) shows that including student characteristics absorbs only slightly more. The fully
specified regression supports the general positive relationship between the school management index
and student performance.
3 Why does management matter in schools?
There are myriad uses of our new indices. In this paper, we push the frontier of understanding the
mechanisms behind the management and performance relationship by focusing on teachers. Our aim
is not to provide a theoretical contribution per se, but rather to formalize a policy discussion around
teacher incentive and selection mechanisms and their relationship to management practices and
student performance. We take wider system-level factors—in particular hiring and firing autonomy,
admissions autonomy and competition between schools—as given and assume that teachers and
students make choices within the confines of this environment.
Real-world education systems are diverse, and in particular the dynamics of the public and private
sector — and the type of private sector offerings — are different across countries. In some contexts,
private schools target aﬄuent households, and jobs in private schools are often seen as more attrac-
tive than public sector jobs, typically providing some form of performance-based compensation. In
other contexts, there has been a growth of ‘low-cost private schools’ that deliberately cater for the
lower end of the income distribution and, in these settings, jobs in the public sector typically confer
significant rents relative to the private sector.
In view of this diversity, we focus our model and empirical test on one particular regional system:
Latin America. We choose Latin America because its education systems are reasonably homogeneous
across countries in terms of the character of public and private schools. Specifically, the private
school system caters to the middle (and upper) classes and accounts for about one-fifth of high
school students. Private schools tend to be better funded (via costly school fees) and in turn pay
higher teacher salaries and offer better facilities. Public schools, on the other hand, are often poorly
funded and operate in highly centralized environments. Teacher pay is set on a rigid scale dictated
by strong unions. Focusing on a region that has such systems makes the applied theory exercise
substantially less complex, and the prevalence of large-scale national surveys in the region opens
many possibilities for future empirical work.
Table 2 reports the correlation exercise in Columns (1) to (3) of Table 1 for Latin American countries
only, and confirms that the relationship between management and student performance is strong
in the region. Further, the coefficient on private schools indicates that students in private schools
achieve higher scores, by about 55 points, than students in public schools. This affords a suitable
empirical environment to study the channels that we are interested in this section.
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3.1 Overview of the theoretical framework
The analysis is built around a student-level education production function. A common, general
formulation is y = A(L,K) + ε where y is a measure of student learning, L and K are respectively
labour and physical capital inputs into the student’s education, A is a (school-specific) productivity
parameter, and ε is an error term. Here, we specialize to y = θ e + a + ε, where θ is teacher
ability, e is teacher effort, and a is household (student and/or parent) effort. That is, we enrich the
specification of labour to allow for (additively separable) teacher and household inputs but abstract
from the role of physical capital and school-level productivity.17 Using a theoretical framework built
around this education production function, we show that school management structures can impact
student learning outcomes via the following three channels:
1. Teacher selection: schools with high management scores offer compensation packages that
select in more able (higher θ) and more intrinsically motivated (lower effort cost) teacher
types.
2. Teacher incentives : schools with high management scores offer compensation packages that
extrinsically incentivize, and adopt practices that intrinsically motivate, more effort from any
given teacher type that selects in.
3. Household incentives : schools with higher management scores institutionalize a strong work
ethic and culture of high achievement among students and encourage greater parental involve-
ment within the school (higher a).
In Section 3.2, we present a simple model that suffices to make the points above. In Section 3.3 and
Section 3.4 we explain, intuitively, how the above selection and incentive effects are driven by people
management and operations management. Then, in Section 3.5 we draw together these results and
discuss implications for policy. We also briefly comment on how predictions would change in an
alternative model featuring ‘low-cost private schools’.
3.2 The model
We focus on a teacher who must decide whether to accept a job offer in her assigned public school,
or decline it and apply to a private school or the outside sector.
Preferences. The teacher is risk neutral and cares about her compensation w and effort e. When
working in the education sector, the teacher’s preferences are w − (e2 − c e). The parameter c
17In principle, parents could play a further role by selecting between schools. Since our PISA data cannot speak
to this issue, we leave the analysis of management-induced household selection for future work. Note that we assume
management practices change effective labour inputs. In their study of the IT industry, Schivardi and Schmitz
[2019] assume that management is an additional input, alongside capital and labour, in an approach that they term
“management as a production technology”.
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captures her intrinsic motivation. This is because for e < c/2 she derives a marginal benefit from
exerting an extra unit of effort in teaching; it is only when e > c/2 that effort costs kick in. We
assume that c = τ +∆. The first component τ denotes the teacher’s baseline intrinsic motivation.
This can be thought of as the realization of a random variable with density function f . The teacher
observes this realization perfectly, while (at the time of hiring) employers observe nothing. The
second component ∆ is a motivational increment that, as we describe below, is determined by the
people management practices in the teacher’s chosen school. When working in the other sector,
the teacher’s preferences are simply w − e2; intrinsic motivation plays no role. We abstract from
differences within classes and focus on a representative household (student plus parents). This
household cares only about its effort level a, and has preferences −(a2 − γ a). The parameter γ is
a motivational increment that is also determined by management practices.
Performance metrics. Let y1 denote a representative student’s learning outcome in a school
that hires the teacher, and y0 denote a representative student’s learning outcome in a school that
does not hire the teacher. To the extent that teachers contribute to learning, one would expect
y1 > y0. We capture this in a simple way by assuming y1 = θe + a + ε and y0 = a + ε. If the
teacher is not hired by a school but instead chooses to work in the outside sector, her performance is
z = θe+ε. The component θ denotes the teacher’s ability. This can be thought of as the realization
of a random variable with density function g, and which is drawn independently of τ . The teacher
observes this realization perfectly, while (at the time of hiring) employers observe nothing. Draws
of the error term ε are independent across employments. We assume throughout that ε is mean
zero and distributed U [ε, ε]. At times, for the purposes of illustration, we also assume a specific
(uniform) distribution for θ, as part of a numerical example that we discuss at the end of this
section.18
Compensation schemes. Schools offer either a performance-pay contract or a fixed wage con-
tract. Under the former, the teacher receives a base wage of W plus a bonus B if her performance
exceeds a threshold y¯. Under the latter, the teacher simply receives a base wage of G. The outside
sector offers a performance-pay contract with a low base wage (normalized to zero) and a bonus β
if performance exceeds a threshold z¯.
The impact of management practices. We assume that people management has two effects.
The first relates to the structure of compensation: good people management practices enable man-
agers to observe, and contract on, the performance of their employees—i.e. to offer a performance-
pay contract. The second relates to teacher motivation: good people management practices enable
managers to cultivate the intrinsic motivation of their staff—i.e. to increase ∆. We assume that
18Note that the basic production function is the same across schools; management practices matter by affecting
which θ-types are hired, the teacher’s choice of e (which depends on which τ -types are hired), and the household’s
choice of a.
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operations management also has two effects. The first relates to the level of compensation: good
operations management practices free up resources and enable managers to offer a higher level of
base pay. The second relates to household effort: good operations management practices help to
create a stimulating environment for students and parents —i.e. to increase γ.
We classify schools into three management types: high (strong people and strong operations man-
agement), intermediate (weak people but strong operations management), and low (weak people
and weak operations management). Performance metrics are indexed accordingly by i = H, I, L.
We assume that high management schools are found exclusively in the private sector, while the
public sector consists of a mix of intermediate and low management schools. This implies that
performance-pay contracts are only offered by private schools (and the outside sector). Figure 6
provides evidence that this key assumption is well-supported in our PISA data. Here, we plot
empirical cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of the PISA-based people management score
by sector and find that the private sector CDF (dashed blue plot) clearly first order stochastically
dominates the public sector CDF (solid red plot).19
Timing. The timing of the game is as follows.
1. Nature chooses the teacher’s two-dimensional type. This realization (τ, θ) is observed by the
teacher but not by employers.
2. Employers announce management structures and compensation schemes.
3. The teacher is assigned (by government) to a public school and decides whether to accept this
post or decline it and apply either to a private school or the outside sector.20
4. Having made an occupational choice, the teacher chooses an effort level. Simultaneously, if
the teacher is in the education sector, households choose effort levels.
5. A performance metric is realized. The teacher is rewarded in accordance with the compensa-
tion scheme announced at Stage 2.
Numerical example. At times in the analysis below, we will invoke specific distributional and
parameter assumptions. In this numerical example, teacher intrinsic motivation is distributed τ ∼
U [0, 10], and teacher ability is distributed θ ∼ U [1, 5]. These random variables are independent of
each other and the error term in the production functions. In a high management private school:
teacher pay is W +B = 55 if yH1 ≥ 4.5 and W = 15 otherwise, and the motivational increments are
∆ = 0.5 and γ = 2. In an intermediate management public school teacher pay is G = 35, and the
19We show empirical CDFs by country in Latin America in Figure B.4 in Appendix B. The private sector CDF
first order stochastically dominates the public sector CDF in Colombia, Peru, Costa Rica and Mexico.
20In assuming this timing, we abstract from applicant choice between schools in the public sector. As Table B.4
and B.5 in Appendix B, the degree to which teachers can choose among public schools varies across Latin America,
yet our model generally fits the reality in these countries.
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motivational increments are ∆ = 0 and γ = 2. And in a low management public school: teacher
pay is G = 30, and the motivational increments are ∆ = 0 and γ = 1. Pay in the outside sector is
β = 50 if z ≥ 1 and 0 otherwise.
Our interest lies in establishing the impact of management practices on student learning via teacher
occupational choice and effort level, and household effort level. We do not model the government’s
assignment rule, or the school principal’s choice of management structure, simply treating these
as exogenous parameters. The model is straightforward to solve (see Appendix A for details) and
yields the insights summarized in the next two sections.
3.3 The impact of good people management
In this subsection, we use the theoretical framework to give a possible explanation for why schools
with good people management may produce better student outcomes. In Section 3.3.1, we decom-
pose the test score gain from people management into two effects: teacher selection and teacher
incentives. If this decomposition is correct, then we should see evidence of these mechanisms in
intermediate school outcomes. We develop this argument, and present corroborative evidence from
our PISA dataset, in Section 3.3.2.
3.3.1 Decomposing the test score gain into teacher selection and incentives
A school of management type i hires the teacher if, given her (τ, θ) type, she expects to receive a
higher payoff teaching in this school compared to other schools or working in the outside sector.
Let the set of (τ, θ) types hired by a school of management type i be denoted by T i. The expected
learning outcome of a representative student (i.e. ex ante, prior to occupational and effort choices)
can therefore be written as
E
[
yi
]
= E
[
yi1 · 1{(τ,θ)∈T i}
]
+ E
[
yi0 · 1{[(τ,θ)/∈T i}
]
,
where 1{(τ,θ)∈T i} and 1{[(τ,θ)/∈T i} are indicator functions for the hiring and not hiring events. In
keeping with the empirical application, we will refer to E
[
yi
]
as the expected test score in school
i.
The difference in expected test score across high and intermediate management schools—that is, the
impact of people management holding operations management constant—can be written as
E
[
yH
]
− E
[
yI
]
= E
[
yH1 · 1{(τ,θ)∈T H}
]
− E
[
yI1 · 1{(τ,θ)∈T I}
]
,
where the equality follows from the fact that people management only impacts test scores when the
teacher is hired (the effect of household effort and the error term difference out). It is helpful to
13
decompose this difference as follows
E
[
yH
]
− E
[
yI
]
=
E
[
(yH1 − y
I
1) · 1{(τ,θ)∈T H}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
teacher incentives
+E
[
yI1 ·
(
1{(τ,θ)∈T H} − 1{(τ,θ)∈T I}
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
teacher selection
. (1)
The first term on the RHS of equation (1) captures what we will term the teacher incentive effect
of good people management practices. Here, we compare the expected test score outcome in a high
management private school with a teacher in the event that the teacher is hired to such a school
against the expected test score outcome in an intermediate management public school with a teacher
in the counterfactual event that the teacher is hired to a high management private school. In this
way, we hold the set of (τ, θ) types fixed and just consider how the incentive environment produces
test scores.
In Lemma 1 in Appendix A, we derive teacher effort in high and intermediate management schools.
Respectively, these are eH = θ B2(ε−ε) +
τ+∆
2 and e
I = τ2 . Substituting, we can write the first incentive
term in (1) as
E
[
(yH1 − y
I
1) · 1{(τ,θ)∈T H}
]
=
∫ ∫
θ

θ
extrinsic︷︸︸︷
B
2(ε− ε)
+
intrinsic︷︸︸︷
∆
2

 · 1{(τ,θ)∈T H} f(θ)g(τ)dθdτ. (2)
We see from this expression that there are two teacher incentive channels. Part of the reason that
test scores are higher in schools with good people management practices is because any given (τ, θ)
type exerts more effort due to: (i) an extrinsic incentive from the bonus B, and (ii) additional
intrinsic motivation arising via the shift term ∆.
The second term in equation (1) captures what we will term the teacher selection effect of good
people management practices. Here, we compare the expected test score outcome in an intermediate
management public school with a teacher in the event that the teacher is hired to such a school
against the expected test score outcome in an intermediate management school with a teacher in
the counterfactual event that the teacher is hired to a high management school. In this way, we
hold the incentive environment fixed and just consider how the selection of (τ, θ) types produces
test scores. Substituting for eI , we can write this second selection term as
E
[
yI ·
(
1{(τ,θ)∈T H} − 1{(τ,θ)∈T I}
)]
=
∫ ∫ ability︷︸︸︷
θ


effort︷︸︸︷
τ
2

 · (1{(τ,θ)∈T H} − 1{(τ,θ)∈T I}
)
f(θ)g(τ)dθdτ. (3)
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We see from this expression that there are also two selection channels. A further part of the reason
that test scores are higher in schools with good people management practices is because: (i) the
τ -types selected in are intrinsically motivated to exert more effort, and (ii) the θ-types selected in
are of greater ability.
To see this, consider the numerical example illustrated in Figure 7. In the top panel, the grey
shaded area depicts the set of (τ, θ) types that are hired by a high management private school. The
unshaded area depicts the set of (τ, θ) types that are hired by an intermediate management public
school. It is clear that the intermediate management public school experiences negative selection
on both dimensions. More able teachers prefer the performance-contingent compensation schemes
available either in private schools or the outside sector. And more intrinsically motivated teachers
prefer private schools because they anticipate exerting higher effort (and hence higher pay).
3.3.2 Predictions for intermediate school outcomes and evidence from PISA
Our theoretical framework suggests two mechanisms, teacher selection and teacher incentives, that
could explain the positive correlation between people management scores and student learning
outcomes apparent in the WMS, PISA and Prova Brasil data. If these mechanisms are correct,
then we should see behavioural responses in intermediate school outcomes. In this section, we set
out these predictions and then explore empirically whether they hold in our PISA data for Latin
America.21
Teacher shortages. The probability of hiring the teacher in a high management private school
is higher than the probability of hiring the teacher in an intermediate management public school
(via teacher selection). In the numerical example shown in the top panel of Figure 7, the area of
the grey region is bigger than the area of the unshaded region.
The PISA dataset does not contain objective information on school-level vacancies, so we use a
series of 4 questions in the school principal questionnaire that ask the principal whether he/she feels
that the school’s capacity is hindered by a lack of qualified teachers in each of math, science, lan-
guage and ‘other subjects’.22 It is worth emphasising that these questions are open to considerable
interpretation. For instance, a principal might answer ‘a lot’ because he/she feels that the school
needs more new posts even if there are few vacancies for existing posts. Conversely, he/she might
answer ‘not all’ because of a belief (or desire to say) that the school is coping despite there being
21These predictions are based on the numerical example illustrated in Figure 7 and are derived (via numerical
integration) in Remarks 1 and 2 in Appendix A. We present the main results with our preferred specification, but
include additional variations of the main explanatory variable in Table B.3 in Appendix B. The results are robust to
alternative specifications.
22We describe how this teacher shortage index, and the other intermediate outcome indices for teacher motivation,
teacher effort, and household involvement, are constructed in Appendix C. All indices are standardized.
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vacancies.23
With this caveat in mind, it can still be instructive to examine the data. Column (1) of Table 3
shows that, consistent with the theory, the teacher shortage index is 0.535 standard deviations lower
among private schools than public schools, significant at the 1 percent level. Column (4) repeats
the specification but with the people management index instead of the private school dummy. The
relationship is consistently negative, suggesting that a one standard deviation increase in the people
management index is correlated with 0.062 lower teacher shortage in schools, marginally significant
at the 10 percent level.
Teacher motivation. The expected intrinsic motivation of a teacher hired to a high management
private school is higher than the expected intrinsic motivation of a teacher hired to an intermediate
management public school (via teacher selection and augmentation of teacher intrinsic motivation).
In the numerical example in the top panel of Figure 7, the vertical height of the black point is
greater than the vertical height of the blue point.
We explore this prediction by using the school climate section of the school principal questionnaire
(questions relating to the perception of teachers’ expectations of their students and meeting student
needs, as well as the morale, enthusiasm, pride and valuation of academic achievement) to construct
an index of teacher motivation. Column (2) of Table 3 shows that, consistent with the theory, the
teacher motivation index is 0.591 standard deviations higher among private schools than public
schools, significant at the 1 percent level. Using the people management index also yields a consistent
relationship, shown in Column (5). The coefficient suggests a one standard deviation higher people
management score is associated with 0.238 higher teacher motivation score, also significant at the
1 percent level.
Teacher effort. The expected effort level of a teacher hired to a high management private school
is higher than the expected effort level of a teacher hired to an intermediate management public
school (via teacher selection, extrinsic teacher incentives, and augmentation of teacher intrinsic
motivation on-the-job)
E
[
θ B
2(ε−ε) +
τ+∆
2
∣∣∣(τ, θ) ∈ T H] > E [ τ2 ∣∣(τ, θ) ∈ T I] .
We explore this prediction by using the school climate section of the school principal questionnaire
(questions relating to how often teachers are absent, late and/or unprepared) to construct an index
of teacher effort. Column (3) of Table 3 shows that, consistent with the theory, the teacher effort
index is 0.792 standard deviations higher among private schools than public schools, significant at
the 1 percent level. Column (6) reports the same specification for the people management index,
23Consistent with this, by far the most common answer given by principals in both sectors is ‘not at all’, as
reflected in the density of the standardized score in Figure B.5 in Appendix B.
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suggesting that a one standard deviation increase in the management score is associated with 0.074
higher teacher effort, significant at the 5 percent level.. For completeness, Figure 8 plots the
coefficients for country-level regressions using the same specifications reported in Columns (4) to
(6) of Table 3. While there is some variation across countries, the results broadly hold.
3.4 The impact of good operations management
In this subsection, we use the theoretical framework to give a possible explanation for why schools
with good operations management may produce better student outcomes. In Section 3.4.1 we
decompose the test score gain from operations management into three effects: teacher selection,
teacher incentives and household incentives. If this decomposition is correct, then we should see
evidence of these mechanisms in intermediate school outcomes. We develop this argument, and
present corroborative evidence from our PISA dataset, in Section 3.4.2.
3.4.1 Decomposing the test score gain into teacher selection, teacher incentives, and
household incentives
The difference in expected test scores across intermediate and low management public schools—that
is, the impact of operations management holding people management constant—is
E
[
yI
]
−E
[
yL
]
=
E
[
yI1 · 1{(τ,θ)∈T I}
]
− E
[
yL1 · 1(τ,θ)∈T L}
]
+ E
[
yI0 · 1{(τ,θ)/∈T I}
]
− E
[
yL0 · 1{(τ,θ)∈T L}
]
.
Letting aI and aL respectively denote household effort in these schools, and using the same decom-
position as before, we can rewrite this difference as
E
[
yI
]
− E
[
yL
]
= E
[
yL1 ·
(
1{(τ,θ)∈T I} − 1{(τ,θ)∈T L}
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
teacher selection
+ aI − aL︸ ︷︷ ︸
household incentives
. (4)
There is no teacher incentive term because both extrinsic teacher incentives and augmentation of
teacher intrinsic motivation depend on people management and this is assumed to be constant across
these schools. We can write the teacher selection term as:
E
[
yL ·
(
1{(τ,θ)∈T I} − 1{(τ,θ)∈T L}
)]
=
∫ ∫ ability︷︸︸︷
θ


effort︷︸︸︷
τ
2

 · (1{(τ,θ)∈T I} − 1{(τ,θ)∈T L}
)
f(θ)g(τ)dθdτ. (5)
Again, there are two teacher selection channels. Part of the reason that test scores are higher in
schools with good operations management practices is because: (i) the τ -types selected in are in-
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trinsically motivated to exert more effort, and (ii) the θ-types selected in are of greater ability.
To see this, consider the numerical example illustrated in Figure 7. The unshaded area in the top
panel depicts the set of (τ, θ) types that are hired by an intermediate management public school,
while the unshaded area in the bottom panel depicts the set of (τ, θ) types that are hired by a low
management public school. It is clear that the intermediate management public school hires both
more and better types.
In contrast to the people management case, there is a channel operating via household incentives.
A further part of the reason that test scores are higher in schools with good operations management
practices is because households (students plus parents) exert more effort due to additional intrinsic
motivation arising via the shift term γ.
3.4.2 Predictions for intermediate school outcomes and evidence from PISA
Again, we set out predictions relating to intermediate school outcomes (see Remark 2 in Ap-
pendix A), and then explore empirically whether they hold in our PISA data.24
Teacher shortages. The probability of hiring the teacher in an intermediate management public
school is higher than the probability of hiring the teacher in a low management public school (via
teacher selection). In the numerical example shown in Figure 7, the unshaded area is larger in the
top panel relative to the bottom panel.
We take this prediction to the data using the 4 questions in the PISA school principal questionnaire
that ask the principal whether they feel that the school’s capacity is hindered by a lack of qualified
teachers (see Appendix C). Column (1) of Table 4 shows a negative and statistically significant
correlation between the operations management index and the teacher shortage index. A one
standard deviation increase in operation score is associated with a 0.076 standard deviation decrease
in the teacher shortage index, significant at the 10 percent level.
Teacher motivation. The expected intrinsic motivation of a teacher hired to an intermediate
management public school is higher than the expected intrinsic motivation of a teacher hired to a
low management public school (via teacher selection). In the numerical example shown in Figure 7,
the vertical height of the blue point in the top panel is greater than the vertical height of the orange
point in the bottom panel.
Column (2) of Table 4 shows that, consistent with the theory, the partial effect of operations score
on the teacher motivation index is positive and significant at 1 percent; a one standard deviation
24We present the main results with our preferred specification, but include additional variations of the main
explanatory variable in Tables B.2 in Appendix B. The results are robust to alternative specifications.
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increase in operation score is associated with a 0.238 standard deviation increase in the teacher
motivation index, significant at the 1 percent level.
Teacher effort. The expected effort level of a teacher hired to an intermediate management public
school is higher than the expected effort level of a teacher hired to a low management public school
(via teacher selection)
E
[
τ
2
∣∣(τ, θ) ∈ T I] > E [ τ2 ∣∣(τ, θ) ∈ T L] .
Column (3) of Table 4 shows that one standard deviation higher operations score is correlated with
0.076 standard deviations higher teacher effort, significant at the 5 percent level.
Household effort The expected level of household effort in an intermediate management public
school is higher than the expected level of household effort in a low management public school (via
augmentation of student intrinsic motivation): aI > aL.
We explore this prediction by using the school climate section of the school principal questionnaire
to construct an index of household effort, combining student behavior questions (relating to how
often students are truant, late, disrespectful and/or disruptive) and parental involvement questions
(relating to the extent to which parents: are interested in, and discuss, their child’s progress and
behaviour; volunteer for school activities; and participate in school governance or other forms of ac-
countability). Column (4) of Table 4 shows that, consistent with the theory, one standard deviation
higher operations management score is correlated with 0.160 higher household effort, significant at
the 1 percent level. For completeness, Figure 9 plots the coefficients for country-level regressions
using the same specifications in Columns (1) to (4) in Table 4. Again, the results broadly hold at
country-level.
3.5 Summary of theoretical prediction
We developed a simple theoretical framework, built around a student-level education production
function, to explore why management practices might matter in schools. Using this framework,
we showed that people management practices may be contributing to higher student test scores
through two channels: teacher selection and teacher incentives. The predictions that these channels
imply for intermediate school outcomes—fewer teacher shortages, higher teacher motivation, and
higher teacher effort in schools with strong people management than in schools with weak people
management—are all well-supported in our PISA data for Latin America.
We also showed that operations management practices may be contributing to higher student test
scores via two channels: teacher selection and household incentives. The empirical support for the
predictions that these channels imply for intermediate school outcomes—fewer teacher shortages,
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higher teacher motivation, higher teacher effort, and higher household effort in schools with strong
operations management than in schools with weak operations management—is also strong.
While this does not represent definitive causal evidence, this combination of theory and descriptive
empirical analysis offers an insight into why management appears to matter in schools and so we
cautiously move on to policy. For example, what type of school management practices might be
changed to drive improved student learning? Our analysis suggests that people management is a
good place to start. While it may not be feasible (on political or budgetary grounds) for govern-
ments to introduce performance pay in public schools, it may be possible to conduct assessments
to judge teacher effectiveness, and for these appraisals to lead to changes in public recognition,
and to opportunities for professional development, likelihood of career advancement, and greater
responsibilities and leadership. Such practices also reward and develop good performers and create
a good employee proposition and could improve both teacher selection and incentives.
Beyond the difference in people management across private and public sectors, a striking feature
of the PISA data is that there is substantial variation in the strength of operations management
practices within the public sector. Some public schools are adopting management practices that
appear to be driving student learning, while others within the same public education system are not.
This suggests a role for government to encourage schools with weak operations management to follow
best practice. As we observe from our mapping exercise, ‘strong’ operations management practices
do two things, they: actively promote quality of delivery in the classroom (e.g. via personalization
of learning, and encouragement to follow best educational practice); and put processes in place
to review school performance and drive change (e.g. dialogue and meetings focused on continuous
improvement, collection and use of student assessment data). Such practices could be adopted more
widely in the public sector and, our analysis suggests, should improve both teacher selection and
household incentives.
To be sure, our goal has not been to produce a global theory; given the diversity of real-world
education systems, we have deliberately focused on one region, Latin America, and developed a
theoretical framework for that context. One could adapt this framework to study different settings,
for instance South Asia and parts of East Africa where there is a preponderance of ‘low-cost private
schools’. Such a model would need to allow for the possibility of ‘queues’ for jobs in public schools
and, as a result, to explicitly model demand -side selection. To the extent that strong management
practices enable public school principals to offer higher levels of compensation and then choose
motivated and able teachers from the resulting queue, then qualitatively similar predictions would
likely still apply. We hope that our new index will enable fertile ground for further research.
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4 Conclusion
Policy makers have begun to set ambitious, universal learning goals. To achieve these targets it
will be necessary to understand why, within and across current education systems, some students
are learning more in some schools than others. Although there are likely many factors at work,
it has been suggested that part of this variation in learning might stem from differences in school
management. To explore this issue and develop policy, academics and practitioners need to be able
to measure school management accurately and cost-effectively at scale across schools and countries,
and be in a position to postulate mechanisms behind any observed relationship between school
management and student learning outcomes.
This paper has responded to these observations by developing new approaches to measurement,
as well as a simple theoretical framework that captures key features of education systems in Latin
America. The first application of our new measurement approach used publicly available data from
the school principal surveys conducted by PISA to construct a school management index spanning
65 countries. This PISA-based school management index can be well-validated against the more
detailed (though also much more expensive) index based on the WMS. As such, it has clear value
in settings where cross-country coverage is important, enabling researchers to study and compare
the (within-country) correlation between management and student/school-level outcomes for a far
wider set of countries than was previously possible.
Our second application used publicly available data from a national administrative survey to con-
struct a school management index spanning all public schools in a single country: Brazil. This Prova
Brasil-based index was also well-validated against the WMS. This second application has value in
settings where within-country coverage, and the availability to merge with other administrative data
sets, is important.
It is striking that both of our new school management indices confirm the strong positive correlation
of school management scores with school-level student outcomes first reported in Bloom et al.
[2015a]. A positive relationship holds for the global PISA sample, and in the census of schools in
Brazil. Our theoretical framework, for the first time, formalizes the possible causal mechanisms in
one of these regions: Latin America. We argued that strong people management practices may be
improving student learning through a combination of teacher selection and incentive effects, and
that schools could be encouraged to adopt practices that reward good performers, develop good
performers, and create a good employee value proposition. Looking to operations management, we
argued that strong operations practices may be improving student learning through a combination of
teacher selection and household incentives, and that schools could be encouraged to adopt practices
promoting quality of delivery in the classroom and adopt processes to review school performance
and drive change. We also provided a suggestive set of evidence for these channels.
Improvements to management practices present an untapped opportunity for potentially large im-
provements in educational outcomes, particularly in cash-strapped regions of the world. One possible
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way of effecting change is to support existing school principals to introduce stronger people and op-
erations management practices, for instance via training and resources. Fryer [2014, 2017] reports
positive results from RCTs injecting best management practices into U.S. public schools. Another
possibility is to contract new managers into existing public schools. Romero et al. [forthcoming]
report mixed results from an RCT in Liberia in which (non-governmental) management teams were
contracted to run public schools: contracting-in raised learning outcomes, but new managers spent
more and may have engaged in strategic behaviour. Investigating how to implement strong peo-
ple and operations management practices to drive learning for all is an important area for future
research.
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Table 1: School management and student performance
PISA Prova Brasil
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Reading PISA points Portuguese scores (SDs)
Management Index 4.904 3.947 3.019 0.068 0.066 0.059
(1.193) (1.172) (0.980) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Private 11.514 2.911
(2.889) (2.560)
[0.000] [0.255]
R-squared 0.24 0.29 0.42 0.03 0.04 0.10
410701 410701 410701 9891822 9891822 9891822
Panel B: Math PISA points Math scores (SDs)
Management Index 4.689 3.937 2.800 0.078 0.075 0.068
(1.267) (1.272) (1.060) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
[0.000] [0.001] [0.008] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Private 11.467 2.001
(2.874) (2.655)
[0.000] [0.451]
R-squared 0.31 0.34 0.45 0.05 0.05 0.10
410701 410701 410701 9891822 9891822 9891822
Panel C: Science PISA points n.a.
Management Index 4.283 3.601 2.553
(1.187) (1.217) (0.982)
[0.000] [0.003] [0.009]
Private 10.215 1.245
(2.751) (2.377)
[0.000] [0.600]
R-squared 0.30 0.33 0.43
# Observations 410701 410701 410701 9890704 9890704 9890704
# Schools 15196 15196 15196 33148 33148 33148
Location FE* Y Y Y Y Y Y
School controls Y Y Y Y
Student controls Y Y
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, p-values in square brackets. OLS regressions for PISA were run with the student-level
PISA dataset using the OECD’s repest Stata command. Standard errors clustered at the school level and use all 5 plausible
values for each subject and student final weights. Prova Brasil regressions run with standard OLS. Standard errors clustered
at the school level and dependent variables are student learning outcomes on national tests at Grade 9 (the same exercise can
be done with primary schools and tests at Grade 5). All specifications include location fixed effects (countries for PISA and
states for Prova Brasil). PISA controls: School controls include school location, student-teacher ratio, log of the number of
students, share of government funding relative to total school funding, and ratio of computers connected to the web as a proxy
for school resources. Student controls include gender, grade, socio-economic status and immigration status. Prova Brasil
controls: School controls include student-teacher ratio, log of the number of students, dummies indicating the presence of an
IT lab, science lab, and library as proxies for school resources. Given availability of principal characteristics, school controls also
include a dummy for male principals, dummies for educational attainment, and dummies for experience as principal. Student
controls include a dummy for male students, a dummy for white students, student households’ consumption index, dummies
for mother educational attainment (grades 1-5, grades 6-9, secondary grades 10-12, and college). For control variables, missing
variables are replaced with a value of -99 and we include an indicator variable with a value of 1 for each imputed value. All
panels use the same sample but have different subject outcome variables. Summary statistics for PISA dependent variables and
controls are presented in Table B.1. 26
Table 2: PISA management index and student performance: Latin America
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Reading PISA points Math PISA points Science PISA points
Management Index 8.255 2.681 2.212 7.442 2.432 1.764 7.859 3.092 2.509
(1.610) (1.252) (1.008) (1.576) (1.230) (1.039) (1.421) (1.144) (0.973)
[0.000] [0.032] [0.028] [0.000] [0.048] [0.089] [0.000] [0.006] [0.009]
Private 56.807 31.921 55.695 32.589 0.000 55.428 33.077
(3.301) (2.956) (3.713) (3.121) (3.735) (3.327)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [8.161] [2.736]
R-squared 0.032 0.173 0.342 0.041 0.185 0.350 0.040 0.172 0.312
# Observations 78144 78144 78144 78144 78144 78144 78144 78144 78144
# Schools 3075 3075 3075 3075 3075 3075 3075 3075 3075
# Countries 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
School controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Student controls Y Y Y
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, p-values in square brackets. OLS regressions for PISA were run with the student-level
PISA dataset for 8 Latin American countries using the OECD’s repest Stata command. Standard errors clustered at the school
level and use all 5 plausible values for each subject and student final weights. All specifications include country fixed effects.
School controls include school location, student-teacher ratio, log of the number of students, share of government funding
relative to total school funding, and ratio of computers connected to the web as a proxy for school resources. Student controls
include gender, grade, socio-economic status and immigration status. For control variables, missing variables are replaced with
a value of -99 and we include an indicator variable with a value of 1 for each imputed value, for each variable with imputed
values.
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Table 3: People management and intermediate outcomes, public and private schools in Latin Amer-
ica
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
z-teacher
shortage
z-teacher
motivation
z-teacher
effort
z-teacher
shortage
z-teacher
motivation
z-teacher
effort
Private School -0.535 0.591 0.792
(0.122) (0.139) (0.128)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
People Index -0.062 0.238 0.074
(0.035) (0.040) (0.033)
[0.077] [0.000] [0.026]
R-squared 0.152 0.142 0.154 0.139 0.169 0.123
Observations 3035 3043 3043 3035 3043 3043
School controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The first row reports the coefficients from regressions of a binary indicator (coded to 1 if the school is a private school, 0
otherwise) on the standardized index of three intermediate school outcomes: teacher shortage, teacher motivation and teacher
effort. The second row reports coefficients from regressions of the standardized people management index on each of the
intermediate school outcomes. The people management index is built out of the school questionnaire from PISA 2012 using
the methodology from Anderson [2008]. All specifications include PISA school final weights and country fixed effects. School
controls include school location, student-teacher ratio, log of the number of students, share of government funding relative to
total school funding, ratio of computers connected to the web as a proxy for school resources, and average student socio-economic
status. For control variables, missing variables are replaced with a value of -99 and we include an indicator variable with a
value of 1 for each imputed value, for each variable with imputed values dummies are added to the specifications.
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Table 4: Operations management and intermediate outcomes, public schools in Latin America
(1) (2) (3) (4)
z-teacher
shortage
z-teacher
motivation
z-teacher
effort
z-household
effort
Operations Management Index -0.080 0.238 0.076 0.160
(0.043) (0.041) (0.038) (0.054)
[0.061] [0.000] [0.044] [0.003]
R-squared 0.0787 0.171 0.154 0.242
Observations 2407 2414 2414 2414
School controls Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: All regressions use data from public schools only. The table reports coefficients from regressions of the standardized
operations management index on each of the intermediate school outcome. The operations management index is built out of the
school questionnaire from PISA 2012 using the methodology from Anderson [2008]. All specifications include PISA school final
weights and country fixed effects. School controls include school location, student-teacher ratio, log of the number of students,
share of government funding relative to total school funding, ratio of computers connected to the web as a proxy for school
resources, and average student socio-economic status. For control variables, missing variables are replaced with a value of -99
and we include an indicator variable with a value of 1 for each imputed value, for each variable with imputed values dummies
are added to the specifications.
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Figure 1: Distribution of overall management scores, PISA vs WMS
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Note: Data for the World Management Survey index for all countries except for Mexico and Colombia can be found at
www.worldmanagementsurvey.org. Distribution of overall management indices standardized within countries. Kernel density
curves estimated using WMS sampling weights (calculated as the inverse probability of being interview on log of number of
students, public status, and population density by state, province, or NUTS 2 region as a measure of location) for the WMS data
and school final weights for the PISA data. Samples include both public and private secondary schools for both datasets, with
the exception of Colombia where WMS data is only available to public primary schools. Number of WMS/PISA observations
are as follow (WMS/PISA): Brazil = 510/561, Canada = 129/770, Colombia = 468/268, Great Britain = 89/422, Germany =
102/158, Italy = 284/926, Mexico = 157/1327, Sweden = 85/179, United States = 263/136.
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Figure 2: PISA-based management index by quartile x PISA student outcomes
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Note: Number of observations: 15,196 schools from 65 countries available in PISA 2012 data. Student outcomes are estimated
using five plausible values and collapsed at the school level using PISA’s senate weights. Quartiles of management are built at
the country level. Test scores are presented as deviations from the global mean.
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Figure 3: Prova Brasil-based management index x WMS management index
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Note: This graph is a binned scatter plot. Each circle represents the average of 5 schools. The sample contains 262 schools
which have data for both Prova Brasil and WMS in 2013. Correlation of 0.19 (p-level:0.00).
32
Figure 4: Prova Brasil-based management index by quartile x student outcomes
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Note: The sample contains 33,148 public secondary schools of Prova Brasil in 2013 for which have available data. For simplicity
and to compare the results to the results of PISA and the WMS, we use student learning outcomes on national tests in
Portuguese and Math at Grade 9. The same exercise can be repeated with primary schools and national tests in Portuguese
and Math at Grade 5.
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Figure 5: Coefficient plot of PISA-based management index x math PISA points, by country
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Note: PISA 2012 data. Regressions are estimated using OECD’s repest command in Stata, by country. The specification
includes all five plausible values for PISA 2012 and student final weights. Each marker represents the coefficient (and vertical
spike represents associated 95% confidence intervals) of the management index on math scores.
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Figure 6: Cumulative distribution of people management, Latin America
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Notes: Cumulative distribution of the PISA-based people management index for private and public schools for 8 Latin American
countries. The people management index is built out of the school questionnaire from PISA 2012 using the methodology from
Anderson [2008]. Sample consists of 3075 schools: 2432 in the public sector and 637 in the private sector.
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Figure 7: Teacher selection
Note: The blue point in the top panel shows average teacher ability θ and baseline intrinsic motivation τ among teacher types
who select into an intermediate management public school; the black point in the same panel shows average θ and τ among
teacher types who select into a competing high management private school. The orange point in the bottom panel shows average
θ and τ among teacher types who select into a low management public school; the black point in the same panel shows average
θ and τ among teacher types who select into a competing high management private school. Both panels are plotted for the
numerical example set out in Section 3.2.
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Figure 8: Coefficient plot of PISA-based people management index x intermediate outcomes, by
country
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Notes: Each marker represents the coefficient (and vertical spike represents the associated 95% confidence intervals) from
regressions of the people management index on the intermediate school outcome indices for each country in Latin America. The
people management index is built out of the school questionnaire from PISA 2012 using the methodology from Anderson [2008].
All specifications include country fixed effects, school controls and PISA school final weights. School controls include school
location, student-teacher ratio, log of the number of students, share of government funding relative to total school funding,
ratio of computers connected to the web as a proxy for school resources, and average student socio-economic status. For control
variables, missing variables are replaced with a value of -99 and we include an indicator variable with a value of 1 for each
imputed value, for each variable with imputed values dummies are added to the specifications.
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Figure 9: Coefficient plot of PISA-based operations management index x intermediate outcomes,
by country
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Notes: Each marker represents the coefficient (and vertical spike represents the associated 95% confidence intervals) from
regressions of the operations management index on the intermediate school outcome indices for each country in Latin America.
The operations management index is built out of the school questionnaire from PISA 2012 using the methodology from Anderson
[2008]. All specifications include country fixed effects, school controls and PISA school final weights. School controls include
school location, student-teacher ratio, log of the number of students, share of government funding relative to total school
funding, ratio of computers connected to the web as a proxy for school resources, and average student socio-economic status.
For control variables, missing variables are replaced with a value of -99 and we include an indicator variable with a value of 1
for each imputed value, for each variable with imputed values dummies are added to the specifications.
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A Appendix: Theoretical derivations
Lemma 1. Assume that the government assigns the teacher to an intermediate management public
school.
1. If the teacher accepts the government’s offer, then she exerts effort eI = τ2 .
2. If the teacher declines the government’s offer and is hired by a high management private school,
then she exerts effort eH = θ B2(ε−ε) +
τ+∆
2 .
3. If the teacher declines the government’s offer and is hired by an outside employer, then she
exerts effort eO = θ β2(ε−ε) .
Proof. Part 1. When working in an intermediate management public school, a teacher with baseline
motivation τ chooses effort to solve
max
e
G− (e2 − (τ) · e).
Differentiation to obtain the first order condition yields the solution stated above. (Here, as in the
cases below, the second order condition necessary for a maximum holds.)
Part 2. When working in a high management private school, a teacher with baseline motivation τ
and ability θ chooses effort to solve
max
e
P ·B +W − (e2 − (τ +∆) · e)
where P is the probability that yH1 exceeds the threshold y¯ given e (and student attention a). Given
the uniform distribution for ε, we can rewrite this probability as
P = Pr (θ e+ a+ ε > y¯) = Pr (θ e+ a− y¯ > −ε) =
ε+ θ e+ a− y¯
ε− ε
.
The first order condition for this optimization problem is
θ B
ε− ε
= 2e− (τ +∆),
which yields the solution stated above.
Part 3. When working in the outside sector, a teacher chooses effort to solve
max
e
PO · β − e2,
where PO is the probability that z exceeds the threshold z¯ given e. We can rewrite this probability
App. 1
as
PO = Pr
(
θ e+ εO > z
)
= Pr
(
θ e− z > −εO
)
=
ε+ θ e− z
ε− ε
.
The first order condition for this optimization problem is
θ β
ε− ε
= 2e,
which yields the solution stated above.
Lemma 2. Assume that the government assigns the teacher to an intermediate management public
school. There exist functions
τG =
56
8θ + 1
− 2θ − 14 , τ
O =
√
25θ2 − 60, and τP =
√
25θ2 − 4− 4θ − 12
such that:
1. The teacher accepts the government’s offer with probability Pr
[
(τ, θ) ∈ T I
]
, where T I ≡ (τ, θ) :
τO(θ) ≤ τ ≤ τG(θ).
2. The teacher declines the government’s offer and accepts an offer from a private school with
probability Pr
[
(τ, θ) ∈ T H
]
, where T H ≡ (τ, θ) : τ ≥ max
{
τG(θ), τP (θ)
}
.
Proof. Part 1. The function τG traces out the loci of (τ, θ)-types who, anticipating subsequent
teacher effort and household effort levels, are indifferent between accepting their government job
offer and declining it in favour of a job in a high management private school, i.e. types for whom
G− (eL)2 + τ eL = B
(
ε+ θ eH + aH − y
ε− ε
)
− (eH)2 + (τ +∆) eH .
Substituting for eL and eH from Lemma 1, together with the parameters in our numerical example
(implying aH = 1), and rearranging yields
τG =
56
8θ + 1
− 2θ − 14 .
Fixing θ, for any τ < τG(θ), the teacher’s payoff from accepting the government’s offer is strictly
higher than her expected payoff from declining and accepting a job in a high management private
school.
The function τO traces out the loci of (τ, θ)-types who, anticipating subsequent teacher effort levels,
are indifferent between accepting their government job offer and declining it in favour of a job in
the outside sector, i.e. types for whom
G− (eL)2 + (τ) eL = β
(
ε+ θ eO − z
ε− ε
)
− (eO)2.
App. 2
Substituting for eL and eO from Lemma 1, together with the parameters in our numerical example,
and rearranging for τ yields
τO =
√
25θ2 − 60.
Fixing θ, for any τ > τO(θ), the teacher’s payoff from accepting the government’s offer is strictly
higher than her expected payoff from declining and accepting a job in the outside sector.
All that remains, is to confirm that there exist values of θ such that τO ≤ τG. Clearly, τG is
decreasing and τO is increasing. Straightforward calculations show that τG − τO is positive and
decreasing on [1, 1.56] which establishes that there exists a set T I ≡ (τ, θ) : τO ≤ τ ≤ τG. For
any pair (τ, θ) in this set, the payoff from accepting the government job (weakly) exceeds both
the expected payoff of declining and accepting a job in a high management private school and the
expected payoff of declining and accepting a job in the outside sector.
Part 2. The function τP traces out the loci of (τ, θ)-types who, anticipating subsequent teacher
effort and household effort levels, and having declined their government job offer, are indifferent
between a job in a high management private school and a job in the outside sector, i.e. types for
whom
B
(
ε+ θ eH + aH − y
ε− ε
)
− (eH)2 + (τ +∆) eH = β
(
ε+ θ eO − z
ε− ε
)
− (eO)2.
Substituting for eH and eO from Lemma 1, together with the parameters in our numerical example,
and rearranging for τ yields
τP =
√
25θ2 − 4− 4θ − 12 .
Fixing θ, for any τ > τP (θ), the teacher’s expected payoff from declining the government’s offer
and accepting a job in a high management private school is higher than her expected payoff from
declining the government’s offer and accepting a job in the outside sector.
Straightforward calculations show that τP − τG is positive and increasing on [1.56, 5] which estab-
lishes that there exists a set T H ≡ (τ, θ) : τ ≥ max
{
τG, τP
}
. For any (τ, θ) in this set, the expected
payoff from declining the government offer and accepting a job in a high management private school
exceeds both the payoff of accepting the government job and the expected payoff of declining and
accepting a job in the outside sector.
Lemma 3. Assume that the government assigns the teacher to a low management public school.
There exist functions
τG
′
= 368θ+1 − 2θ −
1
4 , τ
O′ =
√
25θ2 − 40, and τP =
√
25θ2 − 4− 4θ − 12
such that:
1. The teacher accepts the government’s offer with probability Pr
[
(τ, θ) ∈ T L
]
, where T L ≡
(τ, θ) : τO
′
(θ) ≤ τ ≤ τG
′
(θ).
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2. The teacher declines the government’s offer and accepts an offer from a private school with
probability Pr
[
(τ, θ) ∈ T H
′
]
, where T H
′
≡ (τ, θ) : τ ≥ max
{
τG
′
(θ), τP (θ)
}
.
Proof. Analogous to Lemma 2.
Remark 1. Assume that the government assigns the teacher to an intermediate management public
school. In the numerical example:
1. Pr
[
(τ, θ) ∈ T H
]
= 0.741 > Pr
[
(τ, θ) ∈ T L
]
= 0.031.
2. E
[
τ +∆
∣∣(τ, θ) ∈ T H] = 6.722 > E [τ ∣∣(τ, θ) ∈ T I] = 1.311.
3. E
[
θ B
2(ε−ε) +
τ+∆
2
∣∣∣(τ, θ) ∈ T H] = 8.851 > E [ τ2 ∣∣(τ, θ) ∈ T I] = 0.655.
Proof. Calculated via numerical integration, using Lemmas 1 and 2. The Mathematica notebook
file is available upon request.
Remark 2. Compare an intermediate management public school and a low management public
school. In the numerical example
1. Pr
[
(τ, θ) ∈ T I
]
= 0.031 > Pr
[
(τ, θ) ∈ T L
]
= 0.007.
2. E
[
τ
∣∣(τ, θ) ∈ T I] = 1.311 > E [τ ∣∣(τ, θ) ∈ T L] = 0.545.
3. E
[
τ
2
∣∣(τ, θ) ∈ T I] = 0.655 > E [ τ2 ∣∣(τ, θ) ∈ T L] = 0.301.
4. aI = 1 > aL = 12 .
Proof. Calculated by numerical integration, using Lemmas 1 and 3. The Mathematica notebook
file is available upon request.
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Table B.1: Summary statistics
Mean
Standard
Deviation
10th
pct
25th
pct
50th
pct
75th
pct
90th
pct
N
School
Private school 0.19 (0.39) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 410200
Rural 0.32 (0.46) 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 410209
Student-teacher ratio 17.47 (12.20) 8.70 11.94 15.57 20.17 28.00 380244
Enrolment total 983.89 (789.31) 222.00 439.00 813.00 1317.00 1861.00 394664
Share of govt funding 0.78 (0.32) 0.14 0.68 0.95 1.00 1.00 377927
Location: village 0.13 (0.33) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 410209
Location: small town 0.19 (0.39) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 410209
Location: town 0.28 (0.45) 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 410209
Location: city 0.26 (0.44) 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 410209
Location: large city 0.15 (0.35) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 410209
Computers with internet 0.87 (0.29) 0.35 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 389971
Student grade 0.11 (0.32) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 330163
Students
Math score (PV1) 457.47 (103.02) 329.42 381.84 450.47 528.28 598.15 410701
Reading score (PV1) 465.67 (100.83) 335.44 395.65 465.71 536.32 596.87 410701
Science score (PV1) 466.83 (100.85) 339.18 394.01 463.20 537.52 602.14 410701
Female student 0.51 (0.50) 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 410701
Student age 15.41 (0.53) 14.33 15.25 15.58 15.83 15.92 410586
Student: non-immigrant 0.93 (0.26) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 399606
Student: second-gen 0.04 (0.21) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 399606
Student: first-gen 0.03 (0.16) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 399606
Socio-economic status index 0.71 (0.48) 0.12 0.31 0.65 1.02 1.36 175060
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Table B.2: Above median people management and intermediate outcomes, public and private schools
in Latin America
(1) (2) (3)
z-teacher
shortage
z-teacher
motivation
z-teacher
effort
Above median people -0.186 0.403 0.060
(0.077) (0.073) (0.072)
[0.015] [0.000] [0.406]
R-squared 0.148 0.151 0.132
Above 75th pct people -0.245 0.482 0.065
(0.088) (0.098) (0.086)
[0.005] [0.000] [0.451]
R-squared 0.150 0.152 0.132
Observations 3067 3074 3044
School controls Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y
Notes: The first row reports the coefficient from regressions of a binary indicator Above median people (coded to 1 if the
school’s PISA-based people management score is above the median, 0 otherwise) on the standardized index of three intermediate
school outcomes: teacher shortage, teacher motivation and teacher effort. The second row reports coefficients from regressions
of a binary indicator Above 75th pct people (coded to 1 if the school’s PISA-based people management score is above 75th
percentile, 0 otherwise) on each of the intermediate school outcomes. The people management index is built out of the school
questionnaire from PISA 2012 using the methodology from Anderson [2008]. All specifications include PISA school final weights
and country fixed effects. School controls include school location, student-teacher ratio, log of the number of students, share of
government funding relative to total school funding, ratio of computers connected to the web as a proxy for school resources,
and average student socio-economic status. For control variables, missing variables are replaced with a value of -99 and we
include an indicator variable with a value of 1 for each imputed value, for each variable with imputed values dummies are added
to the specifications.
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Table B.3: Above median operations management and intermediate outcomes, public schools in
Latin America
(1) (2) (3) (4)
z-teacher
shortage
z-teacher
motivation
z-teacher
effort
z-household
effort
Above median ops -0.165 0.323 0.130 0.197
(0.082) (0.083) (0.075) (0.088)
[0.044] [0.000] [0.083] [0.025]
R-squared 0.0790 0.151 0.153 0.234
Above 75pct ops -0.121 0.498 0.221 0.348
(0.101) (0.103) (0.092) (0.121)
[0.233] [0.000] [0.016] [0.004]
R-squared 0.0759 0.164 0.156 0.240
Observations 2407 2414 2414 2414
School controls Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: The row reports the coefficient from regressions of a binary indicator Above median ops (coded to 1 if the school’s
PISA-based people management score is above the median, 0 otherwise) on the standardized index of three intermediate school
outcomes: teacher shortage, teacher motivation and teacher effort. The second row reports coefficients from regressions of
a binary indicator Above 75th pct ops (coded to 1 if the school’s PISA-based people management score is above 75th
percentile, 0 otherwise) on each of the intermediate school outcomes. The operations management index is built out of the
school questionnaire from PISA 2012 using the methodology from Anderson [2008]. All specifications include PISA school final
weights and country fixed effects. School controls include school location, student-teacher ratio, log of the number of students,
share of government funding relative to total school funding, ratio of computers connected to the web as a proxy for school
resources, and average student socio-economic status. For control variables, missing variables are replaced with a value of -99
and we include an indicator variable with a value of 1 for each imputed value, for each variable with imputed values dummies
are added to the specifications.
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Table B.4: Process of entering the public basic education teaching career in Latin American countries in 2012
Country Relevant 
Legislation in 
2011-2012 
Eligibility to Apply Process for Job offer and Allocation 
Argentina  
 
(Buenos 
Aires) 
Law 10.579, 
Estatuto del 
Docente 
Professional degree or 
equivalent in Teaching or 
Education in accordance to 
educational stage. 
Candidates cannot be older 
than 50 years old. Foreign 
applicants must have at 
least 5 years of residency in 
the country. 
1) District government within Province announces vacancies. 
2) Candidate submits application along with supporting documentation. Candidate may choose a 
maximum of 3 districts per application (with no limit on the number of applications submitted).  
3) Decentralized classification tribunal (Tribunales de Clasificación Descentralizados) scores and ranks 
candidates based on supporting documentation (candidates applying to district of residency receive 
bonus points), following guidance and supervision of centralized classification tribunal at the 
provincial level.  
4) District government makes an offer to suitable candidates based on ranking, and offers permanent 
assignment after the candidate passes an assessment carried out during the first year of work. 
Brazil  
 
(Rio de 
Janeiro) 
Municipal Law 
2391/1995 
 
**Subsequent 
legislation was 
approved in 2013 
(Plano de Cargos, 
Carreira e 
Remuneração- 
PCCR, Municipal 
Law No 5623/2013)  
Professional degree in 
Teaching or Education. 
1) State government announces vacancies. 
2) Candidate registers in a specific district, pays an enrollment fee, takes state examination, and 
submits supporting documentation. 
3) State Office of Examination, Statistics and Public Service scores candidate’s supporting 
documentation, conditional on passing state examination. 
4) State government publishes candidates’ final score.  
5) Regional office under the state government (Coordenadoria Regional de Educação) makes an offer 
based on candidate’s score, and offers permanent assignment after no more than 3 years of 
probationary period. 
Chile Law 19.070 passed 
in 1991. 
Subsequent 
reform was 
carried in 2011 
(Law 20.501) with 
focus on school 
principals. 
Professional degree in 
Teaching or Education in 
accordance to educational 
stage. 
1) Municipal government announces vacancies. 
2) Candidate submits individual applications for each vacancy (with no limit on the number 
applications) along with supporting documentation. 
3) Municipal evaluation committee selects 2 to 5 candidates for each vacancy. 
4) Candidate presents a school work proposal to the committee. The proposal is ranked by the 
municipal evaluation committee (additional assessments may be requested). 
5) Municipal evaluation committee recommends candidates suitable for its vacancies, based on its 
ranking. 
6) Mayor makes an offer to suitable candidates, according to the recommendation received from the 
municipal evaluation committee.  
Colombia Law Decree 1278, 
2002, Estatuto de 
Profesionalización 
Docente 
Professional degree or 
equivalent. Non-educators 
are required to hold a 
specialization program on 
Pedagogy or similar field. 
1) Local government (Entidad Territorial) announces vacancies. 
2) Candidate registers, submits supporting documentation, and takes national examination. 
3) Local government committee evaluates the candidate based on a psycho-technical assessment, 
conditional on passing the national examination. 
4) Public Service National Authority decentralized committees (Comisión Nacional del Servicio Civil) 
score candidate’s supporting documentation and carry out interviews.  
5) Public Service National Authority decentralized committees ranks candidates in each locality by 
educational stages and school modalities. Ranking is valid for 2 years. 
6) Local government makes an offer to suitable candidates based on ranking. 
7) Local government offers candidates permanent assignment after 1 year of probationary period, based 
on the school principal’s evaluation. 
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Table B.5: Process of entering the public basic education teaching career in Latin American countries in 2012
Country Relevant 
Legislation in 
2011-2012 
Eligibility to Apply Process for Job offer and Allocation 
Costa Rica 2005 Nueva 
Carrera 
Profesional 
Docente 
Professional degree or 
equivalent in Teaching or 
Education. 
1) National government announces vacancies. 
2) Candidate submits application along with supporting documentation, and indicates region(s) of 
preference. 
3) Public Service National Authority (Autoridad Nacional de Servicio Civil) ranks each candidate, 
allocates vacancies to suitable candidates, according to ranking and candidates’ preferred region. 
4) National government offers candidate a permanent assignment after 3 months of probationary 
period, based on the school principal’s evaluation. 
Mexico 2008, Alianza por 
la Calidad de la 
Educación.  
 
**An education 
reform took place in 
2013: Ley General 
del Servicio 
Profesional Docente 
Professional degree or 
equivalent in Teaching or 
Education in accordance to 
educational stage. States 
have discretion to only 
accept candidates from 
specific teacher-training 
institutes or with a 
minimum time of residency 
in the State.  
1) State government announces vacancies. 
2) Candidate register, submits supporting documentation, and takes national examination. 
3) National government grades examinations and sorts candidates into “Accepted”, “Eligible” and “Not 
accepted” based on score. Cut-off points are determined by the Independent National Evaluation 
Body (Órgano de Evaluación Independiente con Carácter Federalista) and might differ across States. 
4) National government ranks “Accepted” and “Eligible” candidates based on their scores and 
publishes ranking. “Eligible” candidates will require additional training if accepted. 
5) State government makes an offer for a permanent assignment based on its ranking. 
Peru Law 29062, Ley de 
la Carrera Pública 
Magisterial. 
 
**An education 
reform took place in 
Nov2012, and its 
regulation was later 
issued in Mar2013. 
Professional degree in 
Teaching or Education in 
accordance to educational 
stage. Years of experience 
might be a requirement for 
candidates to vacancies in 
special or alternative 
education schools. 
1) National government announces vacancies. 
2) Candidate registers and takes national examination.  
3) Candidate applies to a single school vacancy, conditional on meeting eligibility criteria and passing the 
national examination, and submits supporting documentation. 
4) Evaluation committee (set up at school, municipality, local or regional level) scores candidate based 
on supporting documentation, school interview and classroom teaching practices.  
5) Evaluation committee publishes a ranking of candidates per vacancy. 
6) School makes an offer for a permanent assignment based on ranking provided by evaluation 
committee. 
Uruguay Estatuto Docente 
Regulation No 45, 
approved by Act 
No 68, Resolution 
No 9, 1993; 
modified in 2008 
Professional degree in 
Teaching or Education in 
accordance to educational 
stage. 
1) National council announces vacancies. 
2) Candidate registers and submits supporting documentation. Candidate may apply to multiple 
vacancies in up to two municipalities but must submit individual applications. 
3) Council sets up 3 Evaluation Committees per every 50 to 100 applicants. Committees scores 
candidates based on national level examination, classroom teaching practices, and supporting 
documentation. 
4) Evaluation Committees rank candidates based on their total score. 
5) Nacional Council makes an offer for a permanent assignment based on ranking for each vacancy. 
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Figure B.1: Distribution of management scores, PISA 2012 vs WMS: operations
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Note: Data for the World Management Survey index for all countries except for Mexico and Colombia can be found at
www.worldmanagementsurvey.org. Distribution of operations management indices standardized within countries. Kernel density
curves estimated using WMS sampling weights (calculated as the inverse probability of being interview on log of number of
students, public status, and population density by state, province, or NUTS 2 region as a measure of location) for the WMS data
and school final weights for the PISA data. Samples include both public and private secondary schools for both datasets, with
the exception of Colombia where WMS data is only available to public primary schools. Number of WMS/PISA observations
are as follow (WMS/PISA): Brazil = 510/561, Canada = 129/770, Colombia = 468/268, Great Britain = 89/422, Germany =
102/158, Italy = 284/926, Mexico = 157/1327, Sweden = 85/179, United States = 263/136.
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Figure B.2: Distribution of management scores, PISA 2012 vs WMS: operations
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Note: Data for the World Management Survey index for all countries except for Mexico and Colombia can be found at
www.worldmanagementsurvey.org. Distribution of people management indices standardized within countries. Kernel density
curves estimated using WMS sampling weights (calculated as the inverse probability of being interview on log of number of
students, public status, and population density by state, province, or NUTS 2 region as a measure of location) for the WMS data
and school final weights for the PISA data. Samples include both public and private secondary schools for both datasets, with
the exception of Colombia where WMS data is only available to public primary schools. Number of WMS/PISA observations
are as follow (WMS/PISA): Brazil = 510/561, Canada = 129/770, Colombia = 468/268, Great Britain = 89/422, Germany =
102/158, Italy = 284/926, Mexico = 157/1327, Sweden = 85/179, United States = 263/136.
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Figure B.3: WMS score by quartile x country-specific student outcomes
Note: Reproduced from Bloom et al. [2015a]. Performance measures for 1002 observations: 472 for Brazil, 77 for Canada, 152
for India, 82 for Sweden, 86 for the UK and 133 for the US. At the time of writing, the authors of Bloom et al. [2015a] had
conducted the WMS in 8 countries, the listed 6 plus Germany and Italy. The latter two countries are not included in this figure
because data on student learning outcomes was not available to the authors.
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Figure B.4: Cumulative distribution of people management: by country in Latin America
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Notes: Cumulative distribution of the PISA-based people management index for private and public schools for each one of the
8 Latin American countries in the PISA 2012 dataset. The people management index is built out of the school questionnaire
from PISA 2012 using the methodology from Anderson [2008]. Sample sizes are as follows: Argentina: 183 schools (63 private,
120 public). Brazil: 561 schools (79 private, 482 public). Chile: 201 schools (137 private, 64 public). Colombia: 268 schools (62
private, 106 public). Costa Rica: 158 schools (22 private 136 public). Mexico: 1327 schools (196 private, 1131 public). Peru:
207 schools (50 private, 157 public). Uruguay: 164 schools (28 private, 136 public).
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Figure B.5: Standardized teacher shortage scores, by sector
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Notes: Teacher Shortage index is built out of four PISA 2012 questions: “is your school’s capacity to provide instruction hindered
by any of the following issues? a lack of qualified [science, math, language, other subjects] teachers”. The responses are scored
as 1 = not at all, 2 = very little, 3 = to some extent and 4 = a lot. The index is built using the methodology in Anderson
[2008]. Measures are standardized.
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C Data
C.1 Construction of the PISA-based indices
To construct a PISA-based school management index, we followed a three-step approach. First, we
classified each of the PISA questions either under one of the WMS topics or under “not management”.
We were able to classify 53 2012 PISA questions into 14 WMS topics and using this mapping as
a starting point, we further classified 32 2015 PISA questions into 12 WMS topics. For operations
management, we classified 40 2012 PISA questions into 11 WMS topics and using this mapping
as a starting point, we further classified 30 2015 PISA questions into 11 WMS topics. For people
management, we classified 13 questions into 3 WMS topics using the 2012 questionnaire, and 2
questions into 1 WMS topic using the 2015 questionnaire. Table C.6 provides a summary of the
mapping for PISA 2012 and Prova Brasil 2013 used in this paper as well as a mapping for PISA
2015.
Table C.6: Mapping of Management Practices in Publicly Available Survey Data
WMS Management Practice WMS Description
# of Questions Mapped
PISA 2012 PISA 2015 Prova Brasil 2013
Operations Management
1) Standardization of
Instructional Processes
School uses meaningful processes that allow students to learn over time. 7 1 9
2) Personalization of
Instruction and Learning
School incorporates teaching methods that ensure all pupils can master
the learning objectives.
3 3 9
3) Data-Driven Planning and
Student Transitions
School uses assessment and easily available data to verify learning
outcomes at critical stages.
3 3
4) Adopting Educational Best
Practices
School incorporates and shares teaching best practices and pupil
strategies across classrooms accordingly.
5 3 3
5) Continuous Improvement
School implements processes towards continuous improvement and encourages
lessons to be captured and documented.
8 7
6) Performance Tracking School performance is regularly tracked with useful metrics.
7) Performance Review School performance is reviewed with appropriate metrics. 5 4 2
8) Performance Dialogue
School performance is discussed with appropriate content, depth and
communicated to teachers.
3 2
9) Consequence Management School has mechanisms in place to follow-up on performance issues.
10) Target Balance
School covers a sufficiently broad set of targets at the school,
department and individual levels.
4 4
11) Target Inter-Connection School establishes well-aligned targets across all levels. 1 1
12) Time Horizon of Targets School takes a rational approach to planning and setting targets.
13) Target Stretch School sets targets with the appropriate level of difficulty. 1 1
14) Clarity and Comparability
of Targets
School sets understandable targets and openly communicates and compares
school, department and individual performance.
7 6
People Management
15) Rewarding High Performers
School implements a systematic approach to identifying good and bad
performance, rewarding teachers proportionately.
5 2
16) Removing Poor Performers School deals with underperformers promptly.
17) Promoting High Performers School promotes employees based on job performance. 4 2
18) Managing Talent School nurtures and develops teaching and leadership talent. 1
19) Retaining Talent School attempts to retain employees with high performance.
20) Attracting Talent/
Creating a Distinctive Employee Value Proposition
School has a thought-through approach to attract employees. 3 5
Second, we manually assigned scores following the conceptual guidelines of the scoring grid of the
World Management Survey, similar to the exercise conducted in the census-based management
surveys such as the US Census Management and Organizational Practices Survey (MOPS), where
values indicating best practices receive higher scores than values indicating poor practices. Values
are normalized from 0 to 1.25
25MOPS has since been replicated in a number of other countries. Its questions follow the WMS topics and look
to measure similar practices, but with self-reported answers.
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Third, to build the overall management index, and the operations and people management sub-
indices, we follow Anderson [2008]. This methodology weights the impact of the included variables
by the sum of their row in the inverse variance-covariance matrix, thereby assigning greater weight to
questions that carry more “new information”. Given that the importance (weight) of one questions is
relative to the important of all others, we conservatily drop schools missing more than one manage-
ment question (approximately 15% of schools are dropped, yet all countries are still included in the
final sample). We also built the indices using alternative methods (straightforward standardization,
factor analysis, including the Bartlett correction) which yielded similar results.
PISA 2015 has a reduced number of questions relative to the 2012 questions we used to measure
people management. Several questions were moved to the new teacher questionnaire which was not
mandatory for countries in 2015, preventing us from building an identically rich index across both
years. For this reason, we focus on the richer 2012 data. A visual inspection of the distributions for
the 2015 PISA-based management index for operations and people management shown in Figures
C.6 and C.7 when compared to the distributions for 2012 indices in Figures B.1 and B.2 confirm that
the 2012 indices, especially the people management index, are a better fit for this exercise.
We run two additional exercises to validate our index. First, we test whether the results are
being driven by one specific question in the management index. To do this, we estimate the partial
correlation of each of the 53 management questions on student performance, controlling for a partial
index which takes into account all remaining management questions, standardized using Anderson
[2008]. We find that the partial indices are positive and statistically significant throughout all
individual regressions, suggesting that no single question is driving our results. Second, we test the
importance of having both operations and people management questions in the index. This is to
validate whether it is feasible to use the 2015 PISA data. To do this we run a regression where
we include both operations and people management indices to the specification. This specification
indicates whether each of the indices contain additively separable relevant information to explain
student performance. We find that the coefficients remain positive and statistically significant across
all subjects when including country fixed effects (same specification as Column (1) of Table 1),
and remain positive and statistically significant in reading, marginally non-significant in math and
science when fully specified (same specification as Column (3) of Table 1). Overall, these results
suggest that both measures are still meaningful (tables are available upon request).
The list of questions included in the PISA 2012 management index and its mapping to the individual
questions is described below.
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Figure C.6: Distribution of management scores, PISA 2015 vs WMS: operations
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Note: Data for the World Management Survey index for all countries except for Mexico and Colombia can be found at
www.worldmanagementsurvey.org. Distribution of operations management indices standardized within countries. Kernel density
curves estimated using WMS sampling weights (calculated as the inverse probability of being interview on log of number of
students, public status, and population density by state, province, or NUTS 2 region as a measure of location) for the WMS data
and school final weights for the PISA data. Samples include both public and private secondary schools for both datasets, with
the exception of Colombia where WMS data is only available to public primary schools. Number of WMS/PISA observations
are as follow (WMS/PISA): Brazil = 510/421, Canada = 129/562, Colombia = 468/258, Great Britain = 89/381, Germany =
102/156, Italy = 284/291, Mexico = 157/138, Sweden = 85/192, United States = 263/158.
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Figure C.7: Distribution of management scores, PISA 2015 vs WMS: people
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Note: Data for the World Management Survey index for all countries except for Mexico and Colombia can be found at
www.worldmanagementsurvey.org. Distribution of people management indices standardized within countries. Kernel density
curves estimated using WMS sampling weights (calculated as the inverse probability of being interview on log of number of
students, public status, and population density by state, province, or NUTS 2 region as a measure of location) for the WMS data
and school final weights for the PISA data. Samples include both public and private secondary schools for both datasets, with
the exception of Colombia where WMS data is only available to public primary schools. Number of WMS/PISA observations
are as follow (WMS/PISA): Brazil = 510/421, Canada = 129/562, Colombia = 468/258, Great Britain = 89/381, Germany =
102/156, Italy = 284/291, Mexico = 157/138, Sweden = 85/192, United States = 263/158.
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WMS questions Questions
Var. name in 
questionnari
e
Value label
V
a
l
u
e
MGMT 
score
All classes 1 0.00
Some classes 2 0.50
Not for any class 3 1.00
All classes 1 0.00
Some classes 2 0.50
Not for any class 3 1.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
All classes 1 1.00
Some classes 2 0.50
Not for any class 3 0.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
a) How does the 
school encourage 
incorporating new 
teaching practices 
into the classroom?
4) Adopting Educational Best Practices
Are assessments of students in <national modal grade for 15-year-olds> used to 
identify aspects of instruction or the curriculum that could be improved?
SC18Q07
3) Data-Driven Planning and Student Transitions
a) Is data used to 
inform planning and 
strategies? If so how 
is it used – 
especially in regards 
to student transitions 
through grades/ 
levels?
Are assessments of students in <national modal grade for 15-year-olds> used to 
inform parents about their child’s progress?
SC18Q01
Are assessments of students in <national modal grade for 15-year-olds> used to 
make decisions about students’ retention or promotion?
SC18Q02
b) What drove the 
move towards more 
data-driven 
planning/ tracking?
Which of the following measures aimed at quality assurance and improvement 
do you have in your school? Answer: Systematic recording of data including 
teacher and student attendance and graduation rates, test results and 
professional development of teachers.
SC39Q03
2) Personalization of Instruction and Learning
Which of the following statements apply in your school? Answer: Mathematics 
teachers in the school follow a standardised curriculum that specifies content at 
least on a monthly basis.
SC40Q03
Which of the following statements apply in your school? Answer: The school 
has a policy on how to use computers in mathematics instruction (e.g. amount of 
computer use in mathematics lessons, use of specific mathematics computer 
programs).
SC40Q01
Which of the following statements apply in your school? Answer: All <national 
modal grade for 15-year-olds> mathematics classes in the school use the same 
textbook.
SC40Q02
b) How do you as a 
school leader ensure 
that teachers are 
effective in 
personalising 
instruction in each 
classroom across the 
school?
Which of the following options describe what your school does for <national 
modal grade for 15-year-olds> students in mathematics classes? Answer:  In 
mathematics classes, teachers use pedagogy suitable for students with 
heterogeneous abilities (i.e. students are not grouped by ability).
SC15Q04
b) What tools and 
resources are 
provided to teachers 
(e.g. standards-
based lesson plans 
and textbooks) to 
ensure consistent 
level of quality in 
delivery across 
classrooms?
SC15Q02
Which of the following measures aimed at quality assurance and improvement 
do you have in your school? Answer: Implementation of a standardised policy 
for mathematics (i.e. school curriculum with shared instructional materials 
accompanied by staff development and training).
SC39Q10
1) Standardisation of Instructional Processes
a) How structured or 
standardised are the 
instructional 
planning processes 
across the school?
Which of the following options describe what your school does for <national 
modal grade for 15-year-olds> students in mathematics classes? Answer: 
Mathematics classes study similar content, but at different levels of difficulty.
SC15Q01
Which of the following options describe what your school does for <national 
modal grade for 15-year-olds> students in mathematics classes? Answer: 
Different classes study different content or sets of mathematics topics that have 
different levels of difficulty.
PISA 2012
App. 15
WMS questions Questions
Var. name in 
questionnari
e
Value label
V
a
l
u
e
MGMT 
score
Did not occur 1 0.00
1-2 times during 
the year
2 0.20
3-4 times during 
the year
3 0.40
Once a month 4 0.60
Once a week 5 0.80
More than once a 
week
6 1.00
Did not occur 1 0.00
1-2 times during 
the year
2 0.20
3-4 times during 
the year
3 0.40
Once a month 4 0.60
Once a week 5 0.80
More than once a 
week
6 1.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
Did not occur 1 0.00
1-2 times during 
the year
2 0.20
3-4 times during 
the year
3 0.40
Once a month 4 0.60
Once a week 5 0.80
More than once a 
week
6 1.00
Did not occur 1 0.00
1-2 times during 
the year
2 0.20
3-4 times during 
the year
3 0.40
Once a month 4 0.60
Once a week 5 0.80
More than once a 
week
6 1.00
Did not occur 1 0.00
1-2 times during 
the year
2 0.20
3-4 times during 
the year
3 0.40
Once a month 4 0.60
Once a week 5 0.80
More than once a 
week
6 1.00
a) How does the 
school encourage 
incorporating new 
teaching practices 
into the classroom?
b) How are these 
learning or new 
teaching practices 
shared across 
teachers? What 
about across grades 
or subjects? How 
does sharing happen 
across schools 
(community, state-
wide etc), if at all?
c) Who within the 
school gets involved 
in changing or 
improving process? 
How do the different 
staff groups get 
involved in this?
SC34Q18
Which of the following measures aimed at quality assurance and improvement 
do you have in your school? Answer: Teacher mentoring.
5) Continuous Improvement
a) When problems 
(e.g. within school/ 
teaching tactics/ 
etc.) do occur, how 
do they typically get 
exposed and fixed?
Please indicate the frequency of the following activities and behaviours in your 
school during <the last academic year>. Answer: When a teacher has problems 
in his/her classroom, I take the initiative to discuss matters.
SC34Q07
Please indicate the frequency of the following activities and behaviours in your 
school during <the last academic year>. Answer: I engage teachers to help build 
a school culture of continuous improvement.
SC34Q11
4) Adopting Educational Best Practices
SC39Q08
Please indicate the frequency of the following activities and behaviours in your 
school during <the last academic year>. Answer: I lead or attend in-service 
activities concerned with instruction.
SC34Q17
Please indicate the frequency of the following activities and behaviours in your 
school during <the last academic year>. Answer: I promote teaching practices 
based on recent educational research.
SC34Q05
Please indicate the frequency of the following activities and behaviours in your 
school during <the last academic year>. Answer: I set aside time at faculty 
meetings for teachers to share ideas or information from in-service activities.
PISA 2012
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WMS questions Questions
Var. name in 
questionnari
e
Value label
V
a
l
u
e
MGMT 
score
Did not occur 1 0.00
1-2 times during 
the year
2 0.20
3-4 times during 
the year
3 0.40
Once a month 4 0.60
Once a week 5 0.80
More than once a 
week
6 1.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
Did not occur 1 0.00
1-2 times during 
the year
2 0.20
3-4 times during 
the year
3 0.40
Once a month 4 0.60
Once a week 5 0.80
More than once a 
week
6 1.00
Did not occur 1 0.00
1-2 times during 
the year
2 0.20
3-4 times during 
the year
3 0.40
Once a month 4 0.60
Once a week 5 0.80
More than once a 
week
6 1.00
c) Who within the 
school gets involved 
in changing or 
improving process? 
How do the different 
staff groups get 
involved in this?
a) How often do you 
review (school) 
performance --
formally or 
informally-- with 
teachers and staff?
Please indicate the frequency of the following activities and behaviours in your 
school during <the last academic year>. Answer: I evaluate the performance of 
staff.
SC34Q22
8) Performance Dialogue
Please indicate the frequency of the following activities and behaviours in your 
school during <the last academic year>. Answer: I ask teachers to participate in 
reviewing management practices.
SC34Q12a) How are these 
review meetings 
structured?
7) Performance Review
During the last year, have any of the following methods been used to monitor 
the practice of mathematics teachers at your school? Answer: Tests or 
assessments of student achievement.
SC30Q01
During the last year, have any of the following methods been used to monitor 
the practice of mathematics teachers at your school? Answer: Teacher peer 
review (of lesson plans, assessment instruments, lessons).
SC30Q02
During the last year, have any of the following methods been used to monitor 
the practice of mathematics teachers at your school? Answer: Principal or 
senior staff observations of lessons.
SC30Q03
During the last year, have any of the following methods been used to monitor 
the practice of mathematics teachers at your school? Answer: Observation of 
classes by inspectors or other persons external to the school.
SC30Q04
 Which of the following measures aimed at quality assurance and improvement 
do you have in your school? Answer: Seeking written feed-back from students 
(e.g. regarding lessons, teachers or resources).
SC39Q07
Which of the following measures aimed at quality assurance and improvement 
do you have in your school? Answer: External evaluation.
SC39Q06
5) Continuous Improvement
Please indicate the frequency of the following activities and behaviours in your 
school during <the last academic year>. Answer: I conduct informal 
observations in classrooms on a regular basis (informal observations are 
unscheduled, last at least 5 minutes, and may or may not involve written 
feedback or a formal conference).
SC34Q19
Which of the following measures aimed at quality assurance and improvement 
do you have in your school? Answer: Internal evaluation/self-evaluation.
SC39Q05
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WMS questions Questions
Var. name in 
questionnari
e
Value label
V
a
l
u
e
MGMT 
score
Did not occur 1 0.00
1-2 times during 
the year
2 0.20
3-4 times during 
the year
3 0.40
Once a month 4 0.60
Once a week 5 0.80
More than once a 
week
6 1.00
Did not occur 1 0.00
1-2 times during 
the year
2 0.20
3-4 times during 
the year
3 0.40
Once a month 4 0.60
Once a week 5 0.80
More than once a 
week
6 1.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
Did not occur 1 0.00
1-2 times during 
the year
2 0.20
3-4 times during 
the year
3 0.40
Once a month 4 0.60
Once a week 5 0.80
More than once a 
week
6 1.00
Did not occur 1 0.00
1-2 times during 
the year
2 0.20
3-4 times during 
the year
3 0.40
Once a month 4 0.60
Once a week 5 0.80
More than once a 
week
6 1.00
Did not occur 1 0.00
1-2 times during 
the year
2 0.20
3-4 times during 
the year
3 0.40
Once a month 4 0.60
Once a week 5 0.80
More than once a 
week
6 1.00
a) How are these 
review meetings 
structured?
a) What types of 
targets are set for the 
school to improve 
student outcomes? 
Which staff levels 
are held accountable 
to achieve these 
stated goals?
13) Target Stretch
a) How tough are 
your targets? How 
pushed are you by 
the targets?
Please indicate the frequency of the following activities and behaviours in your 
school during <the last academic year>. Answer: I use student performance 
results to develop the school’s educational goals.
SC34Q02
11) Target Inter-Connection
a) How are these 
goals cascaded 
down to the different 
staff groups or to 
individual staff 
members?
Please indicate the frequency of the following activities and behaviours in your 
school during <the last academic year>. Answer: I discuss the school’s 
academic goals with teachers at faculty meetings.
SC34Q14
10) Target Balance
Are assessments of students in <national modal grade for 15-year-olds> used to 
compare the school to <district or national> performance?
SC18Q04
Are assessments of students in <national modal grade for 15-year-olds> used to 
monitor the school’s progress from year to year?
Please indicate the frequency of the following activities and behaviours in your 
school during <the last academic year>. Answer: I make sure that the 
professional development activities of teachers are in accordance with the 
teaching goals of the school.
SC34Q03
SC18Q05
Are assessments of students in <national modal grade for 15-year-olds> used to 
compare the school with other schools?
SC18Q08
SC34Q13
Please indicate the frequency of the following activities and behaviours in your 
school during <the last academic year>. Answer: I discuss academic 
performance results with the faculty to identify curricular strengths and 
weaknesses.
SC34Q16
8) Performance Dialogue
 Please indicate the frequency of the following activities and behaviours in your 
school during <the last academic year>. Answer: When a teacher brings up a 
classroom problem, we solve the problem together.
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WMS questions Questions
Var. name in 
questionnari
e
Value label
V
a
l
u
e
MGMT 
score
Did not occur 1 0.00
1-2 times during 
the year
2 0.20
3-4 times during 
the year
3 0.40
Once a month 4 0.60
Once a week 5 0.80
More than once a 
week
6 1.00
Did not occur 1 0.00
1-2 times during 
the year
2 0.20
3-4 times during 
the year
3 0.40
Once a month 4 0.60
Once a week 5 0.80
More than once a 
week
6 1.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
Did not occur 1 0.00
1-2 times during 
the year
2 0.20
3-4 times during 
the year
3 0.40
Once a month 4 0.60
Once a week 5 0.80
More than once a 
week
6 1.00
Yes 1 1.00
No 2 0.00
No change 1 0.00
Small change 2 0.33
Moderate change 3 0.66
Large change 4 1.00
No change 1 0.00
Small change 2 0.33
Moderate change 3 0.66
Large change 4 1.00
No change 1 0.00
Small change 2 0.33
Moderate change 3 0.66
Large change 4 1.00
a) If I asked one of 
your staff members 
directly about 
individual targets, 
what would they tell 
me?
b) Are there any non-
financial or financial 
bonuses/ rewards for 
the best performers 
across all staff 
groups? How does 
the bonus system 
work (for staff and 
teachers)?
SC34Q22a) How does your 
evaluation system 
work? What 
proportion of your 
employees' pay is 
related to the results 
of this review?
SC31Q05
15) Rewarding High Performers
Are assessments of students in <national modal grade for 15-year-olds> used to 
make judgements about teachers’ effectiveness?
SC18Q06
To what extent have appraisals of and/or feedback to teachers directly led a 
change in salary?
SC31Q01
To what extent have appraisals of and/or feedback to teachers directly led a 
financial bonus or another kind of monetary reward?
SC31Q02
To what extent have appraisals of and/or feedback to teachers directly led a 
public recognition from you?
Please indicate the frequency of the following activities and behaviours in your 
school during <the last academic year>. Answer: I evaluate the performance of 
staff.
SC39Q01
Which of the following measures aimed at quality assurance and improvement 
do you have in your school? Answer: Written specification of student 
performance standards.
SC39Q02
Please indicate the frequency of the following activities and behaviours in your 
school during <the last academic year>. Answer: I refer to the school’s 
academic goals when making curricular decisions with teachers.
SC34Q15
14) Clarity and Comparability of Targets
Please indicate the frequency of the following activities and behaviours in your 
school during <the last academic year>. Answer: I ensure that teachers work 
according to the school’s educational goals.
SC34Q04
c) How do people 
know about their 
own performance 
compared to other 
people’s 
performance?
In your school, are achievement data used in any of the following 
<accountability procedures>? Answer: Achievement data are posted publicly 
(e.g. in the medi1).
SC19Q01
In your school, are achievement data used in any of the following 
<accountability procedures>? Answer: Achievement data are tracked over time 
by an administrative authority.
SC19Q02
Which of the following measures aimed at quality assurance and improvement 
do you have in your school? Answer: Written specification of the school’s 
curricular profile and educational goals.
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WMS questions Questions
Var. name in 
questionnari
e
Value label
V
a
l
u
e
MGMT 
score
Did not occur 1 0.00
1-2 times during 
the year
2 0.20
3-4 times during 
the year
3 0.40
Once a month 4 0.60
Once a week 5 0.80
More than once a 
week
6 1.00
No change 1 0.00
Small change 2 0.33
Moderate change 3 0.66
Large change 4 1.00
No change 1 0.00
Small change 2 0.33
Moderate change 3 0.66
Large change 4 1.00
No change 1 0.00
Small change 2 0.33
Moderate change 3 0.66
Large change 4 1.00
No change 1 0.00
Small change 2 0.33
Moderate change 3 0.66
Large change 4 1.00
Did not occur 1 0.00
1-2 times during 
the year
2 0.20
3-4 times during 
the year
3 0.40
Once a month 4 0.60
Once a week 5 0.80
More than once a 
week
6 1.00
0 0.00
1-25 0.25
26-50 0.50
51-75 0.75
76- 1.00
0 0.00
1-25 0.25
26-50 0.50
51-75 0.75
76- 1.00
b) Are there any non-
financial or financial 
bonuses/ rewards for 
the best performers 
across all staff 
groups? How does 
the bonus system 
work (for staff and 
teachers)?
b) How do you 
monitor how 
effectively you 
communicate your 
value proposition 
and the following 
recruitment process?
Percentage
What percentage of math teachers in your school has attended a programme of 
professional development with a focus on mathematics?
SC35Q02 Percentage
20) Attracting Talent/ Creating a Distinctive Employee Value Proposition
SC31Q06
To what extent have appraisals of and/or feedback to teachers directly led a role 
in school development initiatives (e.g. curriculum development group, 
development of school objectives)?
SC31Q07
d) How do you make 
decisions about 
promotion/ 
progression and 
additional 
opportunities within 
the school, such as 
performance, tenure, 
other? Are better 
performers likely to 
be promoted faster, 
or are promotions 
given on the basis of 
tenure/ seniority?
To what extent have appraisals of and/or feedback to teachers directly led a 
change in the likelihood of career advancement?
SC31Q04
Please indicate the frequency of the following activities and behaviours in your 
school during <the last academic year>. Answer: I work to enhance the school’s 
reputation in the community.
SC34Q01
What percentage of all staff in your school has attended a programme of 
professional development with a focus on mathematics?
SC35Q01
17) Promoting High Performers
b) How do you 
identify and develop 
your star 
performers?
To what extent have appraisals of and/or feedback to teachers directly led to 
opportunities for professional development activities?
SC31Q03
c) What types of 
professional 
development 
opportunities are 
provided? How are 
these opportunities 
personalised to meet 
individual teacher 
needs?
To what extent have appraisals of and/or feedback to teachers directly led 
changes in work responsibilities that make the job more attractive?
15) Rewarding High Performers
Please indicate the frequency of the following activities and behaviours in your 
school during <the last academic year>. Answer: I praise teachers whose 
students are actively participating in learning.
SC34Q06
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C.2 Construction of teacher shortage, teacher motivation, teacher effort, and
household effort indices
We use the Anderson [2008] methodology to build each intermediate teacher outcomes index be-
low.
App. 21
Questions Var. name in questionnarie Value label Value
Not at all 1
Very little 2
To some extent 3
A lot 4
Not at all 1
Very little 2
To some extent 3
A lot 4
Not at all 1
Very little 2
To some extent 3
A lot 4
Not at all 1
Very little 2
To some extent 3
A lot 4
Not at all 1
Very little 2
To some extent 3
A lot 4
Not at all 1
Very little 2
To some extent 3
A lot 4
During <the last academic year>, what proportion of students’ parents participated in 
the following school-related activities? Answer: Discussed their child’s behaviour on 
the initiative of one of their child’s teachers.
SC25Q02 Percentage
During <the last academic year>, what proportion of students’ parents participated in 
the following school-related activities? Answer: Discussed their child’s progress on 
the initiative of one of their child’s teachers.
SC25Q04 Percentage
Strongly agree 1
Agree 2
Disagree 3
Strongly disagree 4
Strongly agree 1
Agree 2
Disagree 3
Strongly disagree 4
Strongly agree 1
Agree 2
Disagree 3
Strongly disagree 4
Strongly agree 1
Agree 2
Disagree 3
Strongly disagree 4
Strongly agree 1
Agree 2
Disagree 3
Strongly disagree 4
Strongly agree 1
Agree 2
Disagree 3
Strongly disagree 4
Strongly agree 1
Agree 2
Disagree 3
Strongly disagree 4
SC28Q01
How much do you agree with these statements about teachers in your school? 
Answer: There is a preference among mathematics teachers to stay with well-known 
methods and practices.
Is your school’s capacity to provide instruction hindered by any of the following 
issues? Answer:  A lack of qualified teachers of other subjects.
In your school, to what extent is the learning of students hindered by the following 
phenomena? Answer: Teachers’ low expectations of students.
SC22Q13
SC22Q14In your school, to what extent is the learning of students hindered by the following 
phenomena? Answer: Teachers not meeting individual students’ needs.
SC14Q01Is your school’s capacity to provide instruction hindered by any of the following 
issues? Answer:  A lack of qualified science teachers.
SC14Q02Is your school’s capacity to provide instruction hindered by any of the following 
issues? Answer: A lack of qualified mathematics teachers.
SC14Q03Is your school’s capacity to provide instruction hindered by any of the following 
issues? Answer:  A lack of qualified <test language> teachers.
How much do you agree with these statements about teachers in your school? 
Answer: Mathematics teachers are interested in trying new methods and teaching 
practices.
SC27Q01
How much do you agree with these statements about teachers in your school? 
Answer: There is consensus among mathematics teachers that academic achievement 
must be kept as high as possible.
SC26Q01Think about the teachers in your school. How much do you agree with the following 
statements? Answer: The morale of teachers in this school is high.
SC26Q02Think about the teachers in your school. How much do you agree with the following 
statements? Answer: Teachers work with enthusiasm.
Think about the teachers in your school. How much do you agree with the following 
statements? Answer: Teachers take pride in this school.
SC26Q03
SC27Q02
Think about the teachers in your school. How much do you agree with the following 
statements? Answer: Teachers value academic achievement.
SC26Q04
SC14Q04
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Questions Var. name in questionnarie Value label Value
Strongly agree 1
Agree 2
Disagree 3
Strongly disagree 4
Strongly agree 1
Agree 2
Disagree 3
Strongly disagree 4
Strongly agree 1
Agree 2
Disagree 3
Strongly disagree 4
Not at all 1
Very little 2
To some extent 3
A lot 4
Not at all 1
Very little 2
To some extent 3
A lot 4
Not at all 1
Very little 2
To some extent 3
A lot 4
Not at all 1
Very little 2
To some extent 3
A lot 4
Not at all 1
Very little 2
To some extent 3
A lot 4
Not at all 1
Very little 2
To some extent 3
A lot 4
Not at all 1
Very little 2
To some extent 3
A lot 4
Not at all 1
Very little 2
To some extent 3
A lot 4
Not at all 1
Very little 2
To some extent 3
A lot 4
Not at all 1
Very little 2
To some extent 3
A lot 4
Not at all 1
Very little 2
To some extent 3
A lot 4
SC22Q11
SC22Q06
SC22Q08
SC29Q02
SC28Q02
How much do you agree with these statements about teachers in your school? 
Answer: There is consensus among mathematics teachers that the development of 
mathematical skills and knowledge in students is the most important objective in 
mathematics classes.
In your school, to what extent is the learning of students hindered by the following 
phenomena? Answer: Teachers having to teach students of heterogeneous ability 
levels within the same class.
How much do you agree with these statements about teachers in your school? 
Answer: There is consensus among mathematics teachers that the social and 
emotional development of the students is as important as their acquisition of 
mathematical skills and knowledge in mathematics classes.
How much do you agree with these statements about teachers in your school? 
Answer: There is consensus among mathematics teachers that it is best to adapt 
academic standards to the students’ levels and needs.
In your school, to what extent is the learning of students hindered by the following 
phenomena? Answer: Students intimidating or bullying other students.
SC22Q05
In your school, to what extent is the learning of students hindered by the following 
phenomena? Answer: Student truancy.
In your school, to what extent is the learning of students hindered by the following 
phenomena? Answer: Students skipping classes.
In your school, to what extent is the learning of students hindered by the following 
phenomena? Answer: Students arriving late for school.
In your school, to what extent is the learning of students hindered by the following 
phenomena? Answer: Students not attending compulsory school events (e.g. sports 
day) or excursions.
In your school, to what extent is the learning of students hindered by the following 
phenomena? Answer: Students lacking respect for teachers.
In your school, to what extent is the learning of students hindered by the following 
phenomena? Answer: Disruption of classes by students.
In your school, to what extent is the learning of students hindered by the following 
phenomena? Answer: Teacher absenteeism.
SC22Q15
SC22Q17In your school, to what extent is the learning of students hindered by the following 
phenomena? Answer: Teachers being too strict with students.
In your school, to what extent is the learning of students hindered by the following 
phenomena? Answer: Teachers being late for classes.
SC22Q18
SC22Q04
SC22Q03
SC22Q02
SC22Q01
SC29Q01
PISA 2012
Teacher Motivation
Teacher Effort
Household Effort
App. 23
Questions Var. name in questionnarie Value label Value
Not at all 1
Very little 2
To some extent 3
A lot 4
There is constant pressure from many 
parents, who expect our school to set 
very high academic standards and to 
have our students achieve them.
1
Pressure on the school to achieve 
higher academic standards among 
students comes from a minority of 
parents.
2
Pressure from parents on the school to 
achieve higher academic standards 
among students is largely absent.
3
During <the last academic year>, what proportion of students’ parents participated in 
the following school-related activities? Answer: Discussed their child’s behaviour 
with a teacher on their own initiative.
SC25Q01 Percentage
During <the last academic year>, what proportion of students’ parents participated in 
the following school-related activities? Answer: Discussed their child’s progress with 
a teacher on their own initiative.
SC25Q03 Percentage
During <the last academic year>, what proportion of students’ parents participated in 
the following school-related activities? Answer: Volunteered in physical activities, 
e.g. building maintenance, carpentry, gardening or yard work.
SC25Q05 Percentage
During <the last academic year>, what proportion of students’ parents participated in 
the following school-related activities? Answer: Volunteered in extra-curricular 
activities, e.g. book club, school play, sports, field trip.
SC25Q06 Percentage
During <the last academic year>, what proportion of students’ parents participated in 
the following school-related activities? Answer: Volunteered in the school library or 
media centre.
SC25Q07 Percentage
During <the last academic year>, what proportion of students’ parents participated in 
the following school-related activities? Answer: Assisted a teacher in the school.
SC25Q08 Percentage
During <the last academic year>, what proportion of students’ parents participated in 
the following school-related activities? Answer: Appeared as a guest speaker.
SC25Q09 Percentage
During <the last academic year>, what proportion of students’ parents participated in 
the following school-related activities? Answer: Participated in local school 
<government>, e.g. parent council or school management committee.
SC25Q10 Percentage
During <the last academic year>, what proportion of students’ parents participated in 
the following school-related activities? Answer: Assisted in fundraising for the 
school.
SC25Q11 Percentage
During <the last academic year>, what proportion of students’ parents participated in 
the following school-related activities? Answer: Volunteered in the school <canteen>.
SC25Q12 Percentage
SC22Q10
Which statement below best characterises parental expectations towards your school? SC24Q01
In your school, to what extent is the learning of students hindered by the following 
phenomena? Answer: Poor student-teacher relations.
PISA 2012
Household Effort
App. 24
C.3 Construction of the Prova Brasil-based school management index
To construct the Prova Brasil-based school management index, we followed the three steps as
detailed in the construction of the PISA-based index. However, as we map variables from both
the school director and teacher questionnaires, we take one further step: we collapse the teacher
dataset at the school level, taking the average of all teacher responses by school, combine the school
principal responses, and compute the school level index. The WMS-Prova Brasil 2013 mapping is
detailed below. For a harmonized version of the Prova Brasil mapping across 2007 to 2017, see
Adelman et al. [2019].
App. 25
WMS questions Questions Questionnaire: Var. name
Optio
n Value label
MGMT 
score
A Sim 0.00
B Não 1.00
A Sim 0.00
B Não 1.00
A Menos de 20%. 0.00
B De 20% a menos de 40%. 0.20
C De 40% a menos de 60%. 0.50
D De 60% a menos de 80%. 0.75
E 80% ou mais. 1.00
A Não sei. 0.00
B Foi escolhido de forma 
participativa pelos 
professores.
1.00
C Foi escolhido por 
somente alguns membros 
da equipe escolar.
0.50
D Foi escolhido por órgãos 
externos à escola.
0.50
E Foi escolhido de outra 
maneira.
missing
A Não, esta turma não 
recebeu o livro didático.
0.00
B Sim, menos da metade da 
turma tem.
0.25
C Sim, metade da turma 
tem.
0.50
D Sim, a maioria tem. 0.75
E Sim, todos têm. 1.00
A Não utilizo porque a 
escola não tem.
0.00
B Nunca. 0.00
C De vez em quando. 0.50
D Sempre ou quase sempre. 1.00
A Não utilizo porque a 
escola não tem.
0.00
B Nunca. 0.00
C De vez em quando. 0.50
D Sempre ou quase sempre. 1.00
A Não utilizo porque a 
escola não tem.
0.00
B Nunca. 0.00
C De vez em quando. 0.50
D Sempre ou quase sempre. 1.00
A Nunca. 0.00
B Algumas vezes. 0.33
C Frequentemente. 0.66
D Sempre ou quase sempre. 1.00
2013
1) Standardisation of Instructional Processes Operations Management
a) How structured or 
standardised are the 
instructional 
planning processes 
across the school?
Na sua percepção, os possíveis problemas de aprendizagem dos 
alunos das série(s) ou ano(s) avaliado(s) ocorrem, nesta escola, 
devido à/ao(s): Não cumprimento dos conteúdos curriculares ao 
longo da trajetória escolar do aluno.
Teacher:
TX_RESP_Q73
Na sua percepção, os possíveis problemas de aprendizagem dos 
alunos das série(s) ou ano(s) avaliado(s) ocorrem, nesta escola, 
devido à/ao(s): Sobrecarga de trabalho dos professores, 
dificultando o planejamento e o preparo das aulas.
Teacher:
TX_RESP_Q74
Quanto do conteúdo previsto você conseguiu desenvolver com os 
alunos desta turma neste ano?
Teacher:
TX_RESP_Q106
b) What tools and 
resources are 
provided to teachers 
(e.g. standards-based 
lesson plans and 
textbooks) to ensure 
consistent level of 
quality in delivery 
across classrooms?
Como se deu a escolha do livro didático neste ano? Principal:
TX_RESP_Q086
Os alunos desta turma têm livros didáticos? Teacher:
TX_RESP_Q99
Gostaríamos de saber quais os recursos que você utiliza para fins 
pedagógicos, nesta turma: Jornais e revistas informativas.
Teacher:
TX_RESP_Q44
Gostaríamos de saber quais os recursos que você utiliza para fins 
pedagógicos, nesta turma: livros de literatura em geral.
Teacher:
TX_RESP_Q45
Gostaríamos de saber quais os recursos que você utiliza para fins 
pedagógicos, nesta turma: máquina copiadora (xerox).
Teacher:
TX_RESP_Q48
d) How does the 
school leader 
monitor and ensure 
consistency in 
quality across 
classrooms?
Nesta escola e neste ano, indique a frequência com que: O(A) 
diretor(a) dá atenção especial a aspectos relacionados com a 
aprendizagem dos alunos.
Teacher:
TX_RESP_Q61
App. 26
WMS questions Questions Questionnaire: Var. name
Optio
n Value label
MGMT 
score
A Sim 0.00
B Não 1.00
A Nunca. 0.00
B Algumas vezes. 0.33
C Frequentemente. 0.66
D Sempre ou quase sempre. 1.00
A Nunca. 0.00
B Algumas vezes. 0.33
C Frequentemente. 0.66
D Sempre ou quase sempre. 1.00
A Nunca. 0.00
B Algumas vezes. 0.33
C Frequentemente. 0.66
D Sempre ou quase sempre. 1.00
A Nunca. 0.00
B Algumas vezes. 0.33
C Frequentemente. 0.66
D Sempre ou quase sempre. 1.00
A Nunca. 0.00
B Algumas vezes. 0.33
C Frequentemente. 0.66
D Sempre ou quase sempre. 1.00
A Sim 0.00
B Não 1.00
A Sim 0.00
B Não 1.00
A Sim 0.00
B Não 1.00
A Não foram organizadas 
atividades de formação 
0.00
B Poucos professores. 0.25
C Um pouco menos da 
metade dos professores.
0.50
D Um pouco mais da 
metade dos professores.
0.75
E Quase todos ou todos os 
professores.
1.00
A Nunca. 0.00
B Algumas vezes. 0.33
C Frequentemente. 0.66
D Sempre ou quase sempre. 1.00
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Operations Management
a) How much does 
the school attempt to 
identify individual 
student needs? How 
are these needs 
accommodated for 
within the 
classroom?
Na sua percepção, os possíveis problemas de aprendizagem dos 
alunos das série(s) ou ano(s) avaliado(s) ocorrem, nesta escola, 
devido à/ao(s): Conteúdos curriculares inadequados às 
necessidades dos alunos.
Teacher:
TX_RESP_Q72
c) What about 
students, how does 
the school ensure 
they are engaged in 
their own learning? 
How are parents 
incorporated in this 
process?
Indique com qual frequência são desenvolvidas as seguintes 
atividades para minimizar as faltas dos alunos neste ano e nesta 
escola: Os professores conversam com os alunos para tentar 
solucionar o problema.
Principal:
TX_RESP_Q045
Indique com qual frequência são desenvolvidas as seguintes 
atividades para minimizar as faltas dos alunos neste ano e nesta 
escola: Os pais/responsáveis são avisados por comunicação da 
escola.
Principal:
TX_RESP_Q046
2) Personalization of Instruction and Learning
Indique com qual frequência são desenvolvidas as seguintes 
atividades para minimizar as faltas dos alunos neste ano e nesta 
escola:  Os pais/responsáveis são chamados à escola para conversar 
sobre o assunto em reunião de pais.
Principal:
TX_RESP_Q047
Indique com qual frequência são desenvolvidas as seguintes 
atividades para minimizar as faltas dos alunos neste ano e nesta 
escola: Os pais/responsáveis são chamados à escola para conversar 
sobre o assunto individualmente.
Principal:
TX_RESP_Q048
Indique com qual frequência são desenvolvidas as seguintes 
atividades para minimizar as faltas dos alunos neste ano e nesta 
escola: A escola envia alguém à casa do aluno.
Principal:
TX_RESP_Q049
Na sua percepção, os possíveis problemas de aprendizagem dos 
alunos das série(s) ou ano(s) avaliado(s) ocorrem, nesta escola, 
devido à/ao(s): Falta de assistência e acompanhamento dos pais na 
vida escolar do aluno.
Teacher:
TX_RESP_Q78
Na sua percepção, os possíveis problemas de aprendizagem dos 
alunos das série(s) ou ano(s) avaliado(s) ocorrem, nesta escola, 
devido à/ao(s): Desinteresse e falta de esforço do aluno.
Teacher:
TX_RESP_Q80
Na sua percepção, os possíveis problemas de aprendizagem dos 
alunos das série(s) ou ano(s) avaliado(s) ocorrem, nesta escola, 
devido à/ao(s): Alto índice de faltas por parte dos alunos.
Teacher:
TX_RESP_Q82
4) Adopting Educational Best Practices Operations Management
a) How does the 
school encourage 
incorporating new 
teaching practices 
into the classroom?
Qual foi a quantidade de docentes desta escola que participou das 
atividades de formação continuada que você organizou nos últimos 
dois anos?
Principal:
TX_RESP_Q027
Nesta escola e neste ano, indique a frequência com que: O(A) 
diretor(a) estimula atividades inovadoras.
Teacher:
TX_RESP_Q65
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WMS questions Questions Questionnaire: Var. name
Optio
n Value label
MGMT 
score
A Nunca. 0.00
B Algumas vezes. 0.33
C Frequentemente. 0.66
D Sempre ou quase sempre. 1.00
A Não existe Conselho de 
Classe nesta escola.
0.00
B Nenhuma vez. 0.25
C Uma vez. 0.50
D Duas vezes. 0.75
E Três vezes ou mais. 1.00
A Não existe Conselho de 
Classe nesta escola.
0.00
B Nenhuma vez. 0.00
C Uma vez. 0.33
D Duas vezes. 0.66
E Três vezes ou mais. 1.00
A Sim 0.00
B Não 1.00
A Não 0.00
B Sim 1.00
A Preferência dos 
professores.
0.00
B Escolha dos professores, 
de acordo com a 
pontuação por tempo de 
serviço e formação.
0.50
C Professores experientes 
com turmas de 
aprendizagem mais 
rápida.
1.00
D Professores experientes 
com turmas de 
aprendizagem mais lenta.
1.00
E Manutenção do professor 
com a mesma turma.
0.50
F Revezamento dos 
professores entre as 
séries.
0.50
G Sorteio das turmas entre 
os professores.
0.50
H Atribuição pela direção 
da escola.
0.50
I Outro critério. missing
J Não houve critério. 0.00
2013
4) Adopting Educational Best Practices Operations Management
c) How does the 
school ensure that 
teachers are utilising 
these new practices 
in the classroom? 
How often does this 
happen?
Nesta escola e neste ano, indique a frequência com que: O(a) 
diretor(a) dá atenção especial a aspectos relacionados com a 
aprendizagem dos alunos. 
Teacher:
TX_RESP_Q61  
7) Performance Review Operations Management
a) How often do you 
review (school) 
performance --
formally or 
informally-- with 
teachers and staff?
Conselho de classe é um órgão formado por todos os professores 
que lecionam em cada turma/série. Neste ano, quantas vezes se 
reuniram os conselhos de classe desta escola?
Principal:
TX_RESP_Q031
O Conselho de Classe é um órgão formado por todos os 
professores que lecionam em cada turma/série. Neste ano e nesta 
escola, quantas vezes se reuniu o Conselho de Classe?
Teacher:
TX_RESP_Q52
17) Promoting High Performers People Management
b) How do you 
identify and develop 
your star 
performers?
Na sua percepção, os possíveis problemas de aprendizagem dos 
alunos das série(s) ou ano(s) avaliado(s) ocorrem, nesta escola, 
devido à/ao(s): Insatisfação e desestímulo do professor com a 
carreira docente.
Teacher:
TX_RESP_Q75
Nos últimos dois anos, você organizou alguma atividade de 
formação continuada (atualização, treinamento, capacitação etc.) 
nesta escola?
Principal:
TX_RESP_Q026
18) Managing Talent People Management
b) How do you 
ensure you have 
enough teachers of 
the right type in the 
school?
Neste ano, qual foi o principal critério para a atribuição das turmas 
aos professores?
Principal:
TX_RESP_Q040
Neste ano, qual foi o principal critério para a atribuição das turmas 
aos professores?
Principal:
TX_RESP_Q040
App. 28
WMS questions Questions Questionnaire: Var. name
Optio
n Value label
MGMT 
score
Nunca. 0.00
Algumas vezes. 0.33
Frequentemente. 0.66
Sempre ou quase sempre. 1.00
Nunca. 0.00
Algumas vezes. 0.33
Frequentemente. 0.66
Sempre ou quase sempre. 1.00
Nunca. 0.00
Algumas vezes. 0.33
Frequentemente. 0.66
Sempre ou quase sempre. 1.00
Nunca. 0.00
Algumas vezes. 0.33
Frequentemente. 0.66
Sempre ou quase sempre. 1.00
Nunca. 0.00
Algumas vezes. 0.33
Frequentemente. 0.66
Sempre ou quase sempre. 1.00
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People Management
a) What makes it 
distinctive to teach 
at your school, as 
opposed to other 
similar schools? If 
you were to ask the 
last three candidates 
would they agree? 
Why?
Nesta escola e neste ano, indique seu grau de concordancia: O(A) 
diretor(a) me anima e me motiva para o trabalho
Teacher:
TX_RESP_Q64
Nesta escola e neste ano, indique a frequência com que: sinto-me 
respeitado(a) pelo(a) diretor(a)
Teacher:
TX_RESP_Q66
Nesta escola e neste ano, indique a frequência com que: tenho 
confiança no(a) director(a) como professional
Teacher:
TX_RESP_Q67
Nesta escola e neste ano, indique a frequência com que: participo 
nas decisões relacionadas com o meu trabalho
Teacher:
TX_RESP_Q68
Nesta escola e neste ano, indique a frequência com que: a equipe 
de professores leva em consideração as minhas idéias
Teacher:
TX_RESP_Q69
20) Attracting Talent/ Creating a Distinctive Employee Value Proposition
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